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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The hours of work have been a social and economic
problem in the United States for more than a century and
a half. Although, it is common knowledge that the hours
of work have been greatly reduced through the years, many
of the factors which have caused the decrease, the theories
for and against shorter hours, the economic implications
of shorter hours, and the problems of computing indices of
hours are not manifest. Thus, the purpose of this thesis
is fourfold: 1) To make an historical survey of the hours
of work in the United States, 2) To set forth the various
theories offered by both management and labor in regard
to the shortening of the hours of work, 3) To examine the
relationship of the hours of work to productivity, and to
study statistically and theoretically the distribution of
gains of increased productivity, 4) To examine the statis-
tical problems involved in the computation of an index of
hours
•
Therefore, in Chapter II, the history of the hours of
work in the United States is presented in order that the
reader may obtain an understanding of the problem. The
history extends from the first strike over hours of work
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The third chapter contains a survey of the many theories
which have been advanced by both labor and management concern-
ing shorter hours. In order to classify the arguments for
and against shorter hours of work, the chapter is divided
into three sections: 1) the Social Theories of the Hours
of Work, 2) Labor’s Reasoning for Shorter Hours, and 3)
Management and Shorter Hours. The purpose of this chapter
is t o present the argumentation offered by both sides in the
battle of shorter hours.
Chapter IV is a study of the economic implications of
shorter hours. One of the more important economic problems
concerning the hours of labor is their effect upon produc-
tivity. Thus, the first part of the chapter is a study of
the cause and effect relationship between the hours of work
and productivity. Furthermore, since productivity has great-
ly increased over the years, the last part of the thesis
consists of a statistical and theoretical examination of the
distribution of gains of increased productivity to the
participants in the productive process and to consumers.
Appendix I is devoted to the statistical problems Involved
in the computation of an index of hours. In order to make
the problems more tangible, several indices of hours are
presented and discussed. Since an index number is a method
of measuring the relative change in hours over time, the
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problems concerning the useful statistical device are impor-
tant to a study of the hours of work.
Before entering the main body of the thesis, we should
define certain terms relative to the hours of work so that
the reader will not be confused. First, there is a funda-
mental difference between standard hours and actual hours.
The standard hours of labor are the nominal or basic hours
which have been established either by law or collective
bargaining. On the other hand, actual hours are those which
are, in fact, spent working. Therefore, in any period,
actual hours may either exceed or be less than the standard
hours
.
Furthermore, when reference is made to the hours of
work; it is customary either t o speak of the hours per day,
the hours per week, or the days per week. These classifica-
tions are significant, for no one of them has any direct
connections with the others and thus, no conclusions may be
drawn from one to another. We are now ready to begin the
first chapter.
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CHAPTER II
An Historical Survey of the Hours of Work in the United. States
1. Early Struggles for the Ten-Hour Day
Hours of work have been a. major controversy between la.bor
and management for more than a century in the United States.
The first hours dispute in this country occured in Philadelphia
in May, 1791, when the carpenters struck for a ten-hour day.
Although they failed, in this attempt, they organized a cooper-
ative society and advertised, their work at some twenty five
per cent less than the price established by the masters. The
journeymen carpenters had become incensed because the masters
wanted to pay them by the piece during the short working day
of winter, and by the day for the longer working day of summer.
To eliminate the obvious ineauality, the carpenters demanded
a specific working day from six o'clock in the morning to six
o'clock in the evening with one hour for breakfast and one
hour for dinner .
1
Two years later the "female weavers" went out on strike
along with the men contract workers in Pawtucket, R. I. to
resist an increase in hours; this was the first known strike
in the United States in which women participated . 2 The
lT J. R. Commons and Associates, History of Labor in the
United States
.
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918 ) p. 69.
2. Florence Peterson, Survey of Labor Economics . (New York:
Harper and Brothers"] 19^7 ) p. 420.
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5following year there wa.s a general strike of Boston Carpenters
for a ten-hour day and in 1828, the textile workers in
Paterson, New Jersey, Philadelphia and Boston went on strike
in protest against long hours and low pay*
3
The "sun to sun" rule of work predominated in the new
nation, for the hardy background of the citizens demanded
long and vigorous toil. Furthermore, public opinion of the
period, influenced by the ethic that idleness is a vice,
not only condoned but favored the long working day.^ When
the hours carpenters went out on strike in Boston in 1825
for the ten-hour day, the "gentlemen" engaged in business
(the master carpenters) argued that a shorter working day
would
:
"seduce the journeymen from the course of
industry and economy of time an affect to
which we are anxious to enure them and
to expose them to many temptations and
improvident practices we consider
idleness the most deadly ban to useful-
ness and honorable living and we dread
the consequences of such a measure ut>on
the morals and well being of society. "5
Somewhat sorrowfully, the "gentlemen" engaged in business
observed that the ten-hour day movement was one which:
" >we cannot believe to have originated
with the faithful and industrious sons of
New England", but must be rather" an
evil of foreign growth. 11 °
3. J. R. Commons, History of Labor in the United States .
op. cit., p. 69.
4. Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, Labor 1 s Progress
and Some Basic Labor Problems (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co. Inc. 19387“Vol. 1, p. 465.
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This particular strike which raised such admonitions from the
masters failed, although it was timely, coming in the spring
of the year.
The next prominent ten-hour strike was conceived by the
Mechanic's Union of Trade Associations of Philadelphia in 1828.
This association was the first effective city central in the
United States, and the first labor party, the Workingmen*
s
Party, was its offspring. Labor's awakening stemmed from
both economic a.nd political causes. There was inequality
between the citizens, not primarily between employers and
wage earners, but between “producers" and "consumers".
During this period, labor fought for two main demands; leisure
and public education. Little time was allowed for leisure as
long as the system of work, taken from agriculture, was toil
from "sun to sun". During the winter months, the hours were
a little shorter than in the summer, but nevertheless, were
very long.
J. Montgomery in a survey found the following conditions to
be the common ora.ctice:7
5. J. R. Commons, Documentary History of American Industrial
Society
.
(Glendale, California: The H. Clark Co., 1910)
Vol. 6, "D • 76 .
6. Ibid.
7. J. R. Commons, op. cit., p. 95.
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Hours Per Day
11 hours 24 min.
13 hours 31 min.
13 hours 45 min.
Place
Lowell, Mass.
Lowell, Mass.
South & West
Season Average Per Week
Winter
Summer
Summer
73-| hours
75i hours
The protests against these excessive hours of labor were made
primarily by farmers and craftsmen not by the factory workers
who were at this time mostly women and children.
Thomas Skidmore took the lead in New York in 1829, where
the Workingmen’ s Party labored to prevent the working day
from being lengthened to eleven hours from ten. Skidmore,
a machinist and leader of labor’s political activity during
this period, said he would not only oppose the increasing
of the hours of work, but would investigate other phases of
labor-mana.gement relations. Incidentally, when Skidmore
threatened to broaden the issue, the masters promptly aban-
doned their efforts to extend the working day.^
Although the ten-hour day was general in the New York
area by 1829, this was not true of other parts of the
country. Darkness was the only limit of the working hours
of children in the factories of Philadelphia in I830 and
in 1835 "the factory workers of Paterson, New Jersey struck
for an eleven-hour day and got twelve, a reduction of one
hour.
9
8. Herbert Harris, American Labor . (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press 1938) p. 31.
9. J. R. Commons. Documentary History of American Industrial
Society . Vol. 6, p. ol-o87
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Joined by other building tradesmen, the carpenters of
Boston went out on a seven months strike in 1835 > and
although public sympathy was favorable to their cause, the
strike was lost. Nevertheless the news of the Boston action
stirred the Philadelphians, who began a larger movement for
the ten-hour day. They held mass meetings and parades, but
the deciding factor proved to be the award of the ten-hour
day to city employees by the city council. Following this
lead, the masters succumbed. It may be noted that it was
in the building industry that the shorter hours movement
had its origin and gsJLned its impetus. 10
Established in 1834, the first National Trades Union
attempted to advance the moral and intellectual conditions
and pecuniary interests of labor. Thus, one of its purposes
was to help the locals fight for the ten-hour day. Although
the organization only lasted three years, until 1837, the
ten-hour movement did not die. Rather, it received further
impetus in 1840 when President Van Buren ordered the ten-
hour day to be put into effect for government workers. 11
The movement continued to gain momentum, and in 1843 there
was a convention of mechanics in Boston for shorter hours.
Many petitions were submitted to the legislature, which
10. Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, op. cit., p. 466.
11. Marion Cotter Cahill, Shorter Hours
.
(New York: Columbia
Univ. Press, 1932) p. 32.
Vc V.: / .. i . o - )'
t
•
,•
•
•;
'
'
.
.
.
-
v
• ' o
. ?r >r
nr
d
•
‘
)
ro
•• jo
11 '
3 -j
rt o
'
)
'
,, -
• '•
• r
_
...
•
:
'
‘
,
i :*
'
‘
,
‘
•• ?
'
-
• •
-
--
-
•
- i . .
r
u C :
r TOO O• r- r
.0 . 1
.
,
'
'
•• •
:
T o r .4 »
*
investigated the alleged conditions and reported in favor
of the ten-hour day. However, the legislature failed to
take any direct action. In 1848 and 1849, New Hampshire
and Maine passed laws for the shorter working day, but they
were not enforced and did not prove very effective.
These campaigns for shorter hours which have continued
ever since started to show progress during the 1850's. But
the trend toward shorter hours was by no means uniform
throughout all the trades and areas of the country. Long
after the ten-hour day had been gained in some skilled trades,
such as the building trades, the twelve and thirteen-hour
day persisted elsewhere. For example, thirty years after
many of the organized journeymen craftsmen had gained a
forty-eight hour week, many unorganized workers were on a
sixty-five hour or longer week. Industry by industry, plant
by plant, the struggle continued, with successive reductions
from one pla.teau to another. Sometimes ga.ins were not spread
even throughout a single plant but were confined to parti-
cular groups of employees. 12
Thus, the agitation continued up to the Civil War,
which marks a transition in our economy. No longer an
agricultural country, we became an industrial nation; and
with this, the trade union movement became firmly established
12. Florence Peterson, op. cit. p. 421
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and better able to carry on the forthcoming struggles for
the shorter working period.
II
.
The Eight Hour Movement
During the period immediately following the war between
the states, the objective of many labor organizations was
to legislate an eight-hour day into existence. Pressure for
shorter hours was very potent for a number of reasons. In
the first place the return of the soldiers to civilian
occupations roused the fear of job scarcity; secondly,
national unions, which grew very rapidly after the war,
made labor’s voice better heard. Moreover, as industrialism
moved to the front in our economy, cities grew in size, and
this lengthened the effective workday by involving additional
time to go to and from the job. Finally, the workers felt
a growing sense of injustice toward the economic system which
made for very great extremes of wealth and poverty, of long
hours of labor for the many and leisure for the few. 13
One may wonder why the labor leaders of this period
chose political action rather than economic to accomplish
their goal of the eight-hour day. In the first place,
employers were most unlikely to voluntarily grant the eight-
hour day, because they could not reconcile shorter hours
with proper morality, maintenance of output, or minimum
13. Marion Cotter Cahill, op. cit., p. 31
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costs. On the other hand, the unions had not yet attained
sufficient power to consider it advisable to stage an economic
struggle on this question. Moreover, precedent led them to
this method: the reformists of American labor had long felt
that political action was the correct approach to the problem.
Actually, this precedent had some foundation in fact. First,
there was President Van Buren* s Ten-Hour Executive Order of
1840, state laws for the ten-hour day were legislated in
Pennsylvania, New Hampshire and Maine, and finally, the
example of England's legislation.!^
Eight-hour leagues of laborers were formed in numerous
placed to agitate for the establishment of the shorter day.
Many were organized in and about Boston, and others were
soon functioning in the Middle West and even to New Orleans
and San Francisco.
^
The Grand Eight-Hour League of Massachusetts, under the
leadership of Ira Steward and Wendell Phillips, was particu-
larly active. Wendell Phillips, at a meeting in Faneuil
Hall in November, 1865, demanded the eight-hour day to
establish justice and equality of opportunity, by giving
the worker time to develop his intellect. At the same
meeting Ira Steward proposed an eight-hour law for Massa-
chusetts and advocated enforcement by the creation of a
13“ Ibid., p. 32.
15. Ibid., p. 33.
16. W. Phillips, Speeches . Lectures and Letters . Boston,
1894, p. 142.
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commission with powers of investigation and prosecution. 17
Ira Steward, the Boston machinist, devoted his life to
the eight-hour day movement and it was his wife who composed*
the following doggerel:
"Whether you work by the piece.
Or work by the day,
The longer the hours,
The shorter the pay."
In its cruder form, the economic basis for shorter hours
assumed a share -the-work-argument ; if hours were reduced,
more jobs would be available. When this argument was used
originally, labor was willing to accept a reduction of hours
with a commensurate cut in weekly wages, on the theory that
the shorter day would decrease the supply of labor and thus
enable workers in the long run to raise their wage rates.
It was this belief that gave rise to the above doggerel. 18
Ira Steward further argued for the eight-hour day by saying:
"men who labor excessively are robbed
of all ambition to ask for anything
more than will satisfy their bodily
necessities "
and he insisted that reduction of the hours of labor would
stimulate consumption and consequently production as well. 19
The Eight-Hour Leagues and other associations engaged
in the struggle for the shorter working day finally evolved
17. J. R. Commons, Documentary History of American Industrial
Society . (Glendale, California: The H. Clark Co., 1910)
Vol. 9, pp. 302-303.
18. Florence Peterson, op. cit. p. 423.
19. The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, (New York; The
Macmillan Co., 1932) Vol. 7, p. 490.
.; 3 O • 10 0 O
,
' O’ • o 0 3 v . b
i ** $1 > *vof •
;
r :r- -d
-
••> T '-f
;j
- r -
- r-
• •
- ' ' •'
'
t
t
•• •
'
•-
.
'
•->
’
’ O'
'
'
’
’ '
' 9 . . .
'
'
'• ' 3
o' T
^ n
' "
•
-
.
'
r\ p
„
••
-
' o '
;
-
-
’•
' v \ ' ;g. - - v r : r ") :
<= i '*«« f
'x •
~
)?> ' c
'
. .. r
' '
-
'
'
'
O
V n; • : ' o • :':o. - :* ‘:t n ' ' .! rr :j : 5 : > r
.
5S ' • , : ' ' ' •
;
-
'
:»v V •• r :• • •
•
‘J
-
.
<
:
.. ...
• '
-\ —
* 1
.
'
- *
'
t
id
\ ' o o o
•
i
5
*
into the National Labor Union, and William H. Sylvis became
the leader of the movement. However it was short-lived
because of the failure to concentrate on one reform. Besides
the eight-hour demand, they dealt with other issues such as
the land question, prison labor, women in industry and
cooperations. Furthermore the movement lost energy by
attempting to form an independent political party.
In 1868 Congress passed an eight-hour day law for all
workingmen who were employed by or on behalf of the govern-
ment. However, the law was interpreted by many department
heads as carrying with it a reduction in wages. William H.
Sylvis appealed to President Johnson who ordered that there
should be no wage reduction, but the order was never executed
by the various departments because they believed that such
action was illegal. After an appeal to President Grant also
failed to bring about the desired results. Congress finally
in 1872 passed a resolution directing that government workers
should be compensated at the rate of ten hours 1 pay for
eight hours' work. 20
Unlike the National Labor Union, the Knights of Labor
was not organized with the hours auestion as the dominant
motivating force. Such leaders of the Knights as Stephens
and Powderly definitely favored legislative action alone to
20. T. V. Powderly, Thirty Years of Labor . (Columbus, Ohio:
Excelsior Publishing House, 1890, ) p. bj6 .
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attain the eight-hour day, and the record of the organization
indicates they offered little more than moral support to the
issue. 21 Nevertheless, the first national strike into which
the Knights of Labor was drawn was that of the Brotherhood
of Telegraphers for the eight-hour day, pay for Sunday work
and improved conditions in 1883. The Western Union fought
them bitterly. Financial weakness caused the union to
abandon the strike, and the open shop was made the condition
of return to work. This was the sole national attempt of
the Knights of Labor to establish the eight-hour day by
direct action. 22
Even though nineteen states and one territory had pres-
cribed hours of labor by 1886, the laws were rendered ineffec-
tual by clauses allowing contracts for longer working days.
For example
:
"In Minnesota, the legislature has found
it necessary to impose a penalty of
from twenty five to one hundred dollars
to be inflicted upon any officer or
employer of a railroad company who
compels a locomotive engineer or
fireman to labor more than eighteen
hours a day, except in cases of
urgent necessity. I,23
With the advent of the Federation of Organized Trades
and Labor Unions of the United States and Canada, later to be
21. Marion Cotter Cahill, op. cit., p. 40.
22. N. J. Ware, The Labor Movement in the United States .
1860-1895, (New York, D. C. Heath and Co., 19 29 ) p. 129
.
23* Public Laws of Mjnne sota . 1885, Chap. 206, p. 277, cited
in Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles, (New York:
Harcourt Brace and Co., 193&) P. 40.
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known as the American Federation of Labor, the emphasis was
changed from legislative to economic action. The legis-
lative method had failed to bring about shorter working hours.
The eight-hour movement was too revolutionary to be fulfilled
without the compulsion of a strong labor organization. The
press of the nation ridiculed the demand as preposterous.
The Illinois State Register
,
for instance, declared that the:
” one most consummate piece of humbuggery
ever suggested in connection with the labor
question is the so-called eight-hour move-
ment. The thing is really too silly to merit
the attention of a body of lunatics and the
idea of striking for eight hours is about as
sensible as striking for pay without work. f, 25
At its Chicago convention in 1884, the forerunner of the
American Federation of Labor passed a resolution to hold a
general strike on May 1, 1886, and that after this date the
eight-hour day would constitute a day’s labor. They invited
the Knights of Labor to cooperate with them in this venture,
but the leaders of the knights could not decide. Again, at
the convention in 1885, the resolution was proposed and
supported. In March 1886, T. V. Powderly issued a circular
to all assemblies asking them not to rush into the eight-
hour movement. He said there had been no thorough planning
for the movement and thus the Knights of Labor did little
24. Marion Cotter Cahill, dp . c it
. , p . 49
.
25. The Centenni al History of Illinois
,
Vol. 4, Springfield,
TlTinois ; Illinois Centennial Commission 1920, p. 463
cited in Samuel Yellen, op.cit., p. 40.
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officially to aid the proposed walkout. However, unofficially
the members in the local assemblies of the knights s pported
it vigorously, for they felt that a shorter day could furnish
jobs for the unemployed and would provide the worker with
leisure in which to educate and enjoy himself. On May 1,
1886, in response to the eight-hour plea, at least 190,000
workers struck for a shorter da.y, while an additional
150,000 secured their demands merely by the threat of a
strike. Thus the total number of workers engaged in the
movement was 340, 000. One of the centers of the strike
w?s Chicago where 80,000 strikers took part. There was a
group of Syndicalists within the Chicago labor movement, and
although it supported the eight-hour day issue, it felt
little could be accomplished by the movement. Rather, the
Syndicalists believed capitalism could be overthrown. A
demonstration was called at the McCormick Harvester Works,
and as fights broke out between strikers and strikebreakers,
the anti-labor police killed four strikers. So the Syndi-
calist leaders, Parsons, Spries, Fielden, Engel and Schwab
hurriedly passed out leaflets urging the workers to arm
themselves and to meet in Haymarke t Square. Parsons and
others spoke, and the meeting proceeded in an orderly
26. Ibid., p. 42.
27 . Bradstreets, May 15, 1886, cited in Ibid , p. 44.

manner. However, the police arrived to break up the
demonstration; a bomb exploded in their midst, wounding
sixty-six, or whom seven later died. Hysterically, the
police opened fire, wounding two hundred and killing several
of the crowd. 28 Seven leaders of the anarchists were
arrested, and they received little justice at their trial.
Four were finally hung, one committed suicide and the others
received prison terms. The entire episode gave unionism an
unwholesome name, and the Haymarket Square bomb destroyed
whatever success the eight-hour walkout might have obtained.
After the incident, out of the original 190,000 strikers in
the United States, no more than 80,000 remained on strike
and many were locked out. While it is true that 42,000 of
the 190,000 original strikers in the country won their
demands and that 150,000 as has been pointed out, were
granted shorter hours without striking, the concessions were
29
short-lived. Thus, the hours were lengthened again, and
the workmen of the nation turned to the American Federation
of Labor to aid them in their struggle.
According to the available statistics, the average
hours of labor in manufacturing industries were ten per day
r\
in 1890. However, this was not true in all industries.
28. Ibid.
,
p. 55.
29. Ibid., p. 67.
30. Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems, (New York: The Mac-
millan Co., 1914) p. 518.
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In the steel industry, for example, the twelve-hour day was
the accepted rule and continued to be until 1923. In
practically all industries during the period there were
wide differences in hours worked in different cities and
states, and also among various groups of employees within
the same industry. In general, hours were longer in the
South than in the North and longer in the North and longer
in the rural areas than in the industrial areas.
With these general conditions as a background, the
American Federation of Labor launched a strike on May 1,
1890 for the eight-hour day. Instead of a general strike,
the carpenters volunteered to take the lead. The day
chosen for the strike was auiet, but shorter hours were gained
in 137 cities by approximately 46,000 ca.rpenters.31 The
following year the United Mine Workers were supposed to
take the initiative in the strike movement, but their
position was too weak to fulfill the task. In 1898 the
machinists declined to strike for the eight-hour day. In
1900, the granite cutters struck, and a complete victory
was obtained as the result of the strength of their union. 32
This was the last effort for the advance of the eight-hour
movement, for after 1900, the American Federation of Labor
31. Marion Cotter Cahill, op. cit., p. l6l.
32. Ibid., p. 163.
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no longer sponsored a direct action program for the universal
adoption of the eight-hour day. Thus it was that the eight-
hour movement as such came to a close. However, it is not
true that all workers in the United States had gained these
shorter hours, but from this time on the struggle for the
eight-hour day was left to individual unions, and the
program lost its national significance.
III. Hours of Labor from 1900 to the Present
During the first decade of the new century, the agitation
for shorter hours by individual unions became increasingly
stronger. Between 1900 and 1914 the building-trades workers
and a few other fortunately situated a.nd well-organized
groups obtained the forty-four-hour week in various parts
of the country. During this period there was a reduction
of 4.9 hours in the work week of all groups of workers
averaged together. However, in 1914 only 11.8 per cent of
the workers in manufacturing had standard weeks of forty-
eight hours or less, while 48.9 per cent worked fifty-five
hours or more, and 26.9 per cent sixty hours or more. 33
As far as the American Federation of Labor was concerned,
the earlier ambitious shorter-hours 1 program was replaced by
discussion, and the Federation, in 1902, drifted into an
33. Paul H. Douglas, Rea.1 Wages in the United States .
(Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1930 J
,
pp. 112, 114, 119 , 136, 163, and 208.
rr ~ '] <? :;J ';o*v nvc c ; n i' o c - ’ • >• r - • : •* /;o r
_
•
;
k ' '
' 3 ’ r ; . - • -• _
•
t
-
r. I
. o o ’ r
• '-
n [
!
.
•-
.
r>
.
_r •
.•••:'
-
; n a - r-
•
*
t
-n
.
*•
-
•;
j
*
' a )'.••• .i
-
<
•
•• V ; •
•
; ”
‘
- a a."-:
*
- 1
' ‘
-
' *.
' 3 -t ^ 1
.
'
' '
>"
>
'
H-. \ r r - v;-
, y-~< - -• r
*
'
.
-
r
: a
r
.'~
‘
’
'
--o'
.
'
,
^
•
-a r
O'- 'a a 5 ) / )
•
’
•
' .
•
r.
?•' "
- V • • ' ; -
O)
..
•
•
- • 1
-
' 3
. <
'
'
-
r ’ ' a
• • 1
-
•
:
-
' -
rr r > • .ft:'.'
-
- v - .1 • . .
:?o .
'
l
;
•'
>
h
' o"
,
- t < t .
inactive policy, merely recommending:
"that at each succeeding national and
international convention of trade unions,
the eight-hour day and means for its
achievement shall occupy a most prominent
place in discussions; that local unions
and central bodies give the eight-hour
day special consideration at every
opportunity. "34
Nevertheless, the rank and file continued to strive for
shorter hours, and dissatisfaction with the Federation's
"do nothing" policy grew. Thus, the conventions of 1914
and 1915 witnessed minority attempts to make the central
body use the legislative method to obtain the eight-hour
day, but to no avail.
With the advent of World War I, the American Federation
of Labor took a more active interest in shorter hours. In
1916, The Federation cooperated with the Railroad Brother-
hoods to obtain the passage of the Adamson Act. This law
established a basic eight-hour day for employees on inter-
state railroads. 35 During the war period, the demand for
labor was unprecendented, and workers found themselves in
position to organize and press their demands. Furthermore,
they were encouraged to seek the shorter working day by the
favorable attitude of the federal government and by the
requirement of a basic eight-hour day on government contract
34. American Federation of Labor, Proceedings
. 1902, p. 222
35 * Richard A. Lester, Economics o~Labor . (New York: The
Macmillan Co. 1947 ) , p. 369*
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Such vital industries as slaughtering and meat packing, boot
and shoe manufacturing, newsprint paper, the lumber industry-
in the Northwest, and the garment trades adopted the eight-
hour standard during the war in order to attract scarce workers
By 1919, 48.1 per cent of the workers in manufacturing had
secured a basic working week of forty-eight hours or less:
25.8 per cent had full-time weeks of fifty-five hours or more;
and 12.0 per cent were working schedules of sixty hours or
36
more
.
By 1921 more than half of the factory workers, in com-
parison to only one-ninth in 1914, were laboring a forty-eight
hour week, while one-fourth did so in 1914. Nevertheless,
these gains should not be permitted to obscure the fact that
thousands of workers were still employed by firms whose work-
ing periods were much longer. According to a report of the
Federated Engineering Societies In 1922, 300,000 wage earners
in the United States, half of whom were employed in the iron
and steel industry, were still working on the twelve hour
shift basis. Since steel-making is a continuous-process
industry, the shortening of hours necessitates the employment
36. Data for 1919, and 1921 from Census of Manufacturers,
1923, p. 1150.
37. Committee on Work Periods in Continuous Industry, Feder-
ated American Engineering Societies, The Twelve-Hour Shift
in Industry
, p.12.
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22 .
of additional crews, and an entire rearrangement of work shifts
which, from the management's side, presented a more complex
undertaking than a mere curtailment in the number of hours of
plant operation. Thus, this industry was less willing than
others to adopt the eight-hour shift. Furthermore, the steel
unions were not strong and could not force a change.
At its 1926 convention, the American Federation of Labor
made a declaration for the five-day week on the ground that
changes in the method of production had resulted in an excess
capacity to make goods, and in a greater strain on the physical
7Q
and nervous condition of the laborer. In 1927, the conven-
tion emphasized the need for a campaign of education to bring
39
about the universal establishment of the five-day week.
Although the Federation did not move from words to action,
individual unions began to attain the five-day week for their
members. In 1926, there were 40,596 trade union members in
40
sixty-six cities having the five-day, forty-hour week.
The most conspicuous employer who urged the five-day week
was Henry Ford. He argued that the shorter working time was
necessary in order to afford the workers an opportunity to
enjoy the consumption of commodities which they had produced.
This he felt would insure a balance between production and
consumption. By no means did all employers agree, and there
38. American Federation of Labor, Proceedings
, 1926, pp. 197-207
39. American Federation of Labor, Proceedings
,
1927, p. 400.
40. Lamar T. Beman, Five Day Week
,
TNew York : The H. W. Wilson
Company, 1928) p.46.
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was opposition to the proposal.
At any rate by 1930, 55.5 per cent of the building trades
workers, 43.3 per cent of the workers in the automobile indus-
try, 34.4 per cent of those in the radio industry, 27.0 per
cent of those engaged in dyeing and finishing textiles, and
24.9 per cent of those in the aircraft industry had obtained
41
the basic five-day week. At this point, the depression
struck the nation, and as it tightened its stranglehold on
our economy, the six-hour day, as well as the five-day week,
was proposed by the 1932 convention of the American Federation
42
of Labor as a practical solution to the woes of the economy. x
The great depression brought a drastic reduction of hours
actually worked, and a share-the-work movement came into being.
As a result of the most extensive experiment in government
control of hours ever attempted in the United States, there
was a reduction of about 20 per cent in the average standard
working time. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933
extended the federal government regulation of hours to private
employment outside the f ield of transportation and government
contracts. The N.R.A. codes provided for an hours ceiling
and a wage floor. The basic-week provisions of almost every
code were qualified by exemptions and clauses allowing some
* 41.
42.
Extent of the Five - Day Week
,
September, 1931, pp.3-4.
American Federation of Labor,
Monthly Labor Review, Vol.
Proceedings ,1932, p.282.
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elasticity. However, it was felt in some quarters that the
amount of flexibility was inadequate. The basic weekly maxi-
mum hours of labor ranged from 27 hours per week to 56 hours
per week, but by far the most common was the forty hour stan-
43dard week.
Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery make the follow-
ing generalizations concerning the code provisions with respect
to the hours of work: (1) The reduction in the basic work-
week was far greater than in the first thirty years of the
century. (2) The codes did not establish maximum hours which
were greatly lower than the hours actually being worked during
the depression period. (3) Even though (2) above was true,
the N.R.A. prevented a lengthening of the working week which
otherwise would have occurred. (4) This depression curtail-
ment of hours of labor gave permanent impetus to the movement
44
for a shorter working week.
Following the invalidation of the N.R.A.
,
the Fair Labor
standards Act of 1938 was enacted. The hour clause in the act
established a maximum work week, but not a daily maximum, for
employees engaged in interstate commerce and in the production
of goods for interstate commerce. The law provided for time-
and-a-half rates for all hours worked in excess of the maximum,
but did not limit the number of hours any worker could actually
43. The National Recovery Administration
,
American Liberty
League, Washington, D. C. , Document No. 11, January, 1935.
44. Harry A. Millis and Royal E. Montgomery, op.cit., p.484.
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work. It provided for a downward revision of hours; a maximum
of 44 hours a week during the first year, 42 hours the second
year, and 40 hours beginning October, 1940. However, in the
case of seasonal industries, the maximum work day was 12 hours,
and the maximum work week 56 hours for 14 weeks in a year, with
time-and-a-half for hours beyond these maxima. Since the pas-
sage of this Act most unions have directed their attention
toward establishing a normal work week consisting of eight-hour
workdays from Monday through Friday. The Act establishes no
daily maximum, and in the absence of arguments to the contrary,
the 40 hours specified in the law can be spread over six or
seven days or telescoped into fewer than five days without
the payment of overtime rates for longer than eight hours.
In 1938, the average hours worked in the rubber, steel
and automobile industries dropped to 32 per week, but increased
again the following year as business activity increased. By
1941 the rearmament program had brought increases in the aver-
age hours worked per week, and by April, 1942, the average
worker was spending 42.5 hours per week in the factory.
Employees of defense industries were actually working 47 and
48 hours per week. For the duration of World War II actual
hours of work increased until they reached a peak average in
1944 of slightly more than 45 per week for all manufacturing
45. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Information
Bulletin
,
Vol.9, June, 1942, p.6.
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employees.
46
At the beginning of the War, President Roosevelt
issued an order that all statutory provisions affecting the
hours of labor and the payment of overtime should be observed.
In conformity with this policy, the 48 hour week was generally
adopted throughout the war industries, with eight hours over-
time rates in agreement with union contracts and the Pair
Labor Standards Act.
Immediately following the end of the war, the actual time
worked by manufacturing employees declined four hours a week
on the average. Nevertheless, in 1946 actual hours of labor
averaged one hour more than the basic hours. However, some
union contracts in effect in 1946 called for less hours than
forty per week. For example, most of the organized glass,
rubber tire and men’s clothing workers were on a thirty-six-
hour week, although in the glass and rubber tire industries,
overtime pay did not begin until after forty hours had been
worked. The thirty-five hour week prevailed in the women’s
clothing, fur and hat industries and in coal mining; the thirty-
seven hour week was prevalent in newspaper publishing. Many
of the building-trade unions had obtained the thirty and
48thirty-five hour week.
46. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics, 1947 Edition, Bulletin No” §T6, p.54.
47. Ibid.
48. Florence Peterson, op.cit., p.438.
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Thus, we have reviewed a century of struggle for shorter
hours, which has seen hours reduced from an average of four-
teen hours per day to an average of eight hours per day. The
hours of work problem has had a long history in the United
States and represents, as well as any issue, the efforts of
the American labor movement to improve the lot of the working
population.
Furthermore, it reflects the great advancement of our
capitalistic economy that has made it possible for men to
work less and attain the opportunities of leisure.
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CHAPTER III
Hours of Work Theories
Like all problems that are of major concern to more
than one group, the shortening of the hours of labor has
its antagonists and protagonists. It has been natural for
the labor movement, in its efforts to improve the position
of the American workmen, to defend proposals to decrease
the length of the working day and week with utmost vigor.
Management, on the other hand, in its attempts to forestall
the tide has petitioned for public support by counter-
arguments. Thus, the battlelines have been drawn and it
is left to us to examine not the results of the contest,
which have been reviewed in previous chapters of this thesis,
but rather the ammunition used in the various engagements.
It may be noted that the arguments used in the hours
issue usually have reflected the circumstances and environ-
ment within which the struggles were waged. As the s tandards
of hours of labor in the United States have steadily decreased
during the past century, the reasoning for and against shorter
hours has mirrored this change. For the present it is suffi-
cient to note that the arguments have become more economic
in nature.
In structure this chapter is divided into three sections:
1) The Social Theories of the Hours of Work, 2) Labor’s
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Reasoning for Shorter Hours, and 3) Management and Shorter
Hours
.
I. The Social Theories of the Hours of Work
Among the theories which have been advanced concerning
the hours of work, there are many of a social nature* Their
importance, for our purpose, rests upon the fact that they
have been used widely and their influence in shortening the
hours of work has been great. Theories involving citizen-
ship, culture, education, leisure, fatigue and health may
be classified under this general heading.
During the early years of the American labor movement,
the workers resorted to this type of theory; for it, better
than any other, was more directly connected with the con-
cepts of democracy with which the new nation was imbued.
Nevertheless, this must not be interpreted to mean that
these arguments have not been pertinent in more recent times.
They have been important; but the economic implications of
shorter hours have replaced them in relative importance as
our economy has become more complex and the working day and
week has become shorter.
In sociology it is a truism that "Leisure is a salient
objective and a tangible measure of man’s control over his
environment
. Many of the contributions to social progress
Arthur James Todd, Industry and Society, (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1933, p. 238.
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have been a product of the two greatest forms of surplus:
leisure t ime and capital. Since it is not our purpose to
discuss capital, let us consider leisure and its relation to
the hours of work.
During the period when the 14 and 15 hour day was in
effect, the demand for shorter hours was based upon the
worker’s right to the enjoyment of leisure and the need for
time to perform civic activities. Work from ’’sun to sun"
was held to be incompatible with citizenship, for it did
not afford workmen sufficient leisure for the consideration
of public questions, and therefore, condemned them to an
O
inferior position in society. c Furthermore, shorter hours
were justified because they would allow the workers to
devote more time to rational amusements, education and family
duties. In turn, this useful leisure would result in a more
3intelligent, contented and efficient working population.
Thus, the early American labor movement urged more leisure
as a means for the creation of a better social order.
Increased leisure, it was argued, not only made possible
a better social order, but enabled the workers to enjoy
improved health. This logic was transformed into a citizen-
ship argument by stressing the need for a strong race for
21 Commons and Associates, history of Labour in the United
States
,
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918) p. 176.
3. Thomas Sewall Adams and Helen L. Sumner, Labor Problems
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907) p. 261.
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4
military purposes. We shall see later in the chapter that
the proponents of shorter hours have urged leisure on
economic grounds as well as for those social reasons.
Aside from the question of leisure, the social problem
of hours is partly one of physical well-being, for there is
undoubtedly a relationship between the number of continuous
hours of work and the worker's health. Defenders of labor
have been quick to point out that health is the one thing
which the worker cannot afford to get along without. He
simply cannot afford to be ill, for his very existence and
that of his family may well depend upon his ability to work
and to work without lengthly interruptions. Yet, they argue,
modern industry has added greatly to the amount of illness
among workers.^
Many contend that fatigue resulting from overstrain is
a major factor causing illness among the working population.
This view was forcibly presented by Frankfurter and Goldmark
in their brief for the state of Oregon in the case of Bunting
versus Oregon (1917) before the United States Supreme Court.
They said that:
"More recent investigations diow that
not only in the dangerous trades, but
in all industries, a permanent predis-
position to disease and premature death
Marion Cotter Cahill, Shorter Hours, (New York; Columbia
University Press, 1932) P. 14.
5. E,E. Commins and Frank T. De Vyver, The Lab or Problem in
United States
,
(New York; D. Van Nostrand Company
Inc., 1947 ) p. 53.
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exists in the common phenomena of
fatigue and exhaustion. This is a
danger common to all workers even
under good working conditions, in
practically all manufacturing in-
dustries, as distinguished from the
specially hazardous occupations.”
"In ordinary factory work, where no
special occupational diseases threaten,
fatigue in itself constitutes the
most imminent danger to the health
of the workers because, if unrepaired,
it undermines vitality and thus lavs
the foundation for many diseases.”
Therefore, it has been argued that fatigue caused by working
long hours will be injurious to the worker's health.
Although Frankfurter and Goldmark gathered most of their
testimony from physicians, some economists have also sub-
scribed to this argument. Irving Fisher, for example, states:
”A reduction in the length of the
workday would be a chief means of
improving the vitality of workmen,
as well as the worth of life to
them. The fatigue of workmen is
largely t raceable to their long work-
day and serves to start a vicious
cycle .
”
Fatigue from long hours is further indicated by Frank-
furter and Goldmark when after a comprehensive study of the
relationship between fatigue and accidents, they concluded:
6 .
7
.
” when the brain is fatigued,
attention lags and reaction time is
retarded. Hence after overexertion,
Felix Frankfurter and Josephine Goldmark, The Case of the
Shorter Workday
,
(National Consumsrs Leagued 1916 )
,
Vol. 1, pp. 63-64 .
Irving Fisher, Bulletin of the Committee of One Hundred on
National Health^ (The Nat i onal C ons ervation Commiss ion, 1909).
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fatigued workmen are subject to in-
creased danger when reaction time is
u8slowed and attention at its minimum.
More recent evidence has b een advanced by Mr. Kossoris in a
Bureau of Labor Statistics study whereby he found that work
injuries were reduced by as much as two- thirds when working
9hours were reduced from ten to eight.
Therefore, workers have maintained that shorter working
days and weeks will enable better citizenship, more educa-
tion, better health, less fatigue and in turn a more contented
working force. Even though this argument may be true, there
remains the question of what hour schedule is optimum. Or
in other words, what should the hour's schedule be in order
to obtain these ends? Unfortunately there appears t o be no
definite answer to this problem. Mr. Kossoris, after his
study, concludes that there is no such thing as an optimum
hours schedule for all industry. Rather, he feels each
industry must examine its own peculiar conditions and establish
an hour’s schedule accordingly. Nevertheless, in order to
remove the answer from complete generalization, he contends
that a five-day week and eight-hour day are better than a
work schedule of longer hours. 10
8. Felix Frankfurther and Josephine Goldmark, The Case of the
Shorter Workday (National Consumers League, ’1’5’lS’, Vol. 1,
p. 392.
9. Max D. Kossoris, Studies of the Effects of Long Working
Hours
,
(U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
No. 791-A, Oct. 17, 1944) p. 4.
10. Ibid., p. 2.
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I I . Labor's Reasoning for Shorter Hours
During the e arly years of the nineteenth century, the
main arguments of American labor for shorter working hours
revolved about leisure; namely citizenship, education and
culture. But as circumstances changed, the basis for shorter
hours was shifted. Different arguments were used to get a
reduction from the 48 to the 40-hour week than had been used
to reduce the 80 and 72-hour week. At any particular time,
the arguments were presented in such a manner as to convince
the public and employers that the proposed reductions were
practicable as far as business operations were concerned, as
well as desirable for the workers.
As workmen began to agitate for the ten-hour day, the
health argument was introduced to supplement those of leisure
and citizenship. Actually, the problem of fatigue was still
a matter of contention as late as 1937, for the Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainmen stated in a booklet urging the 6-hour
day for all labor that
:
nThe factors of fat igue----have
a place in our considerations of
efficiency, in direct relation
to productivity. The public is
beginning to realize that many
railroad wrecks are due to over-
work There is one way to
clean the slate. Let men labor
a reasonable time, by shortening
the work day
.
TT7“ Shorter Workday
,
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
Cleveland, Ohio, March 1937, pp. 40-41.
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Economic reasons have become more prominent in labor's
bid for shorter hours as technology has advanced and produc-
tivity has increased. At first the economic basis for the
shorter hours assumed a share-the work- argument ; if hours were
reduced more jobs would be available. When this argument was
originally used the labor movement was willing to accept re-
duced hours with a proportionate reduction in wages on the
assumption that the shorter day would decrease the supply of
labor and thus enable workers in the long run to raise their
wage rates. This type of reasoning was aptly expressed by
the famed doggerel of Ira Steward:
"Whether you work by the piece,
Or work by the day.
The longer the hours.
The shorter the pay."^
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, George
Gunton, in a publication that the American Federation of Labor
entitled the "Eight-Hour Movement" said,
"The adoption of an eight-hour system
would tend to increase wages in two
ways: first by reducing enforced idle-
ness; second, by creating new wants,
and raising the standard of living.
The immediate effect of the general
adoption of an eight -hour work day
would be to reduce the working time
of over eight million adult laborers
about two hours a day. This would
withdraw about sixteen million hours
labor a day from the market without
discharging a single laborer. The
!£• Florence Peterson, Survey of Labor Economics, (New York;
Harper and Brothers, 1947) p. 423.
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Industrial vacuum thus created
would be equal to Increasing the
present demand for labor nearly
twenty per cent. In thus
eliminating enforced Idleness
it would remove the first great
obstacle to industrial reform
and social progress.”
"Again the employment of
two million new laborers would
necessarily tend to increase the
of consumers, and thereby enlarge
the market for commodities to that
extent. That such a result would
tend to increase wages is very clear.
Although wages would not necessarily
rise in the same proportion that
enforced idleness is reduced, all
the Influences would be in that
direction. Since enforced idle-
ness is the most powerful obstruc-
tion to a rise of wages, by remov-
ing the unemployed, the direct in-
fluence of the social forces which
tend to promote the rise of real
wages would be increased. ”13
Argumentation of this type continued for many years, and
there envolved no new basic reasoning, but a shift in emphasis
is noticeable. If the period happened to be one of large scale
unemployment, shorter hours were introduced as a means of
bringing about fuller employment. While during an era of low
wages, the higher wage theme was more highly emphasized in
order to raise the standard of living.
In 1932, when the depression was almost at Its lowest
point, the Committee on the Shorter Workday in a report to the
13 . George Gunton, Eight-Hour Movement
,
(Washington, D.C.;
The American Federation of Labor, 1889) p.13.
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annual convention of the American Federation of Labor contended
that the basic problem facing the economy was a problem of
plenty. They believed that this problem could be solved by
striking a balance
" between the increase in
productive efficiency and the
average labor hours so as to
provide a wider and an ade-
quate diffusion of work op-
portunities as well as to
grant the workers larger leis-
ure as a condition precedent
to enhancing consuming power. ,f1 ^
Thus, employment and consumption were stressed in this partic-
ular argument. Also, it may be noted, leisure was mentioned,
not as we have seen before in the social theories, but rather
as a means of increasing demand. This increased demand born
of more leisure would tend, so the argument develops, to bring
consumption in line with the great advances made in production
made possible by technological advancements.
Nevertheless, labor was no longer willing to accept shorter
hours with a commensurate reduction in wages as it had at the
time of Ira Steward. Furthermore, it should be realized that
the higher wages theme was the more recent argument for the
six-hour day and five-day week. All the arguments presented
previously were progressively for the ten-hour and eight-hour
day. The committee on shorter work day stated elsewhere in
their report to the convention that
T4l Arne rican Federation “of "Labor, Proceedings
, 1932, p.283.
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” the advance in wage rates
should keep steady step with ex-
panding productive efficiency,
not only as a matter of social
justice and enlarged purchasing
power, but also as indispensable
to the future prosperity of the
country. There is no other way.
If we are to measurably match
production and consumption, wages
must go up and the hours of labor
be progressively lessened as the
only answer to the machine era in
which we now live.” 1^
This, then, was the foundation upon which the American Federa-
tion of Labor sought to combat the evils of unemployment and
low wages. These problems, of course, were rampant during the
depression years of the thirties when the above proposals were
announced at the 1932 convention. During the 1937 convention,
the committee on shorter workdays presented the same basic
arguments as we have just reviewed. Referring the recommenda-
tions of the committee for a six-hour day and five-day week
I
in order to overcome unemployment. President Green said,
’’Those who have a better remedy,
let them offer it. We know they
cannot advance a better remedy,
and we shall continue to press
for the acceptance of the six
hour day and the five day week
until it is universally applied.” 16
During the early months of 1949 our economy began to feel
the pains of increased unempl oyme nt so characteristic of the
15 . Ibid., p. 2BTI
16. American Federation of Labor, Proceedings, 1937, p. 82
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aftermath of a postwar boom. It is significant that unions once
again began urging a shorter working schedule. The railroads
and 17 non-operating brotherhoods negotiated a 40 hour week at
no reduction in the workers 48 hour pay, effective September
17
1, 1949. John L. Lewis served notice that his United Mine
Workers wanted a 30 or 35 hour week in the new contract for
18
July 1, 1949. A permanent American Federation of Labor com-
mittee began active study of the feasibility of a new drive for
a 30 hour week. 19 The United Electrical Workers, (C.I.O.),
asked Congress to reduce the statutory work week when overtime
20had to be paid from 40 to 35 hours.
The American labor movement’s faith in the power of the
shorter work-day and week to stem unemployment is staunch.
In the past, shorter work schedules have been advanced as the
means of giving workers the necessary leisure to perform their
civic duties and to fulfill their family obligations. More-
over the worker’s health has been closely linked to the length
of the work- day and week. This is particularly true since
the advent of the mass-production industries where monotonous
repetitive machine paced jobs increase the worker’s fatigue.
In addition to these benefits, shorter work schedules have been
TT. Boston Globe, March 23, 1949.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
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offered as a means of raising wages and improving the plane of
living for the working people of our country. And finally,
as we have seen, shorter hours have been proposed as a method
of creating more demand through added leisure and, thus making
consumption proportionate to production.
III. Employers and Shorter Hours
The history of the shorter hours movement in the United
States has been replete with general employer opposition to
reduced hours. Their argumentation against decreasing work
schedules has taken different forms, but fundamentally the
root of their opposition has been the fear that such action
would lead to increased costs; and of course, increased costs,
they have reasoned, would mean less profits.
When workmen began to agitate for a reduction of hours
from the ”sun to sun" schedule, carried over from agriculture,
the masters objected to any shortening of hours on the premise
that it would lead to corruption and vice. The masters argued
vehemently that new-found leisure would corrupt workmen, and
that vices such as drunkenness would grow at a quickening rate
Obviously, this type of reasoning was not on an economic plane
but rather moral implications of the question were stressed.
As a matter of fact, the moral aspects have continued to
play a rather important role in employer opposition. This
concern for the morals of working people has come to be called
"paternalism” by many. Whether or not such "paternalism” is
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justifiable is left to the discretion of the reader.
Employers and employer associations have also capitalized
on quotations from the Bible to show that reductions in hours
are unwarranted. Speaking against the five-day week in 1928,
John E. Edgerton, president of the National Association of
Manufacturers said:
"Six days shalt thou labor and
do all thy work. So reads the
fifth of the great commandments
and for sixty centuries it has
been accepted as the divinely
prescribed standard of economic
effort. It is the perfectly
fixed basis of human achieve-
ment and social contentment.
It has served America admirably
in building the greatest polit-
ical, social and economic system
known to history. And all through
the Great Book the importance and
sacredness of work are emphasized
as life’s first and continuing
obligat ion.
Although these moral and sometimes emotional arguments
against any lessening of the hours schedule have been widely
used by employers, they have also made use of economic reason-
ing. For example, during the thirties when the American
Federation of Labor and other labor organizations were seeking
the thirty hour week, the National Association of Manufacturers
opposed such a program for the following reasons: 1) It
would be impracticable; 2) It would cause prices to rise;
21. Lamar T. Beman, Five Day Week
,
(New York: The H.W. Wilson
Company, 1928) p. 65.
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3) It would cause the standard of living to be lowered; 4)
It would create unemployment; 5) It would impose a shortage
of skilled labor; 6) It would encourage foreign competition;
7) It would increase bankruptcies; 8) It would foster mono-
polies. This association of manufacturers argued that a
thirty hour week would be impracticable because such a program
could not be carried out by many industries because it would
interfere with production. They reasoned that prices would
rise in this manner:
H if wages are fifty cents an
hour under a forty hour week, then
under a thirty hour week wages would
be approximately sixty seven cents
per hour, an increase of one-third.
If ten hours of labor are required
on an article, the labor costs would
be increased from five dollars to
six dollars and sixty seven cents.
The increase, of course, would ob-
viously be felt in increased prices
which all consumers would have to
pay.
This reasoning assumes that the weekly pay and worker efficiency
would be the same after as before the reduction in hours. In
turn, they argued the standard of living would be lowered be-
cause money wages would be the same, while prices rose, thus
reducing real wages. Not only would the wage earners suffer,
but the association felt that the standard of living of salaried
22. Work Less or Earn More ? (You and Industry Series, Booklet
No. 7, 1936, National Association of Manufacturers).
23. Ibid., p. 9.
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workers, non- indust rial workers and farmers would degenerate
as well. In addition, they argued that unemployment would be
increased on account of the reduction in purchasing power which
would automatically reduce demand for outputs. Moreover, "In
many industries the rigid thirty hour week would mean a short-
age of skilled workers who require long training." 24 It was
charged that foreign competition would be encouraged, for
American factories would be forced by increased operating costs
to charge higher prices while their foreign competitors could
sell at lower prices. And finally, they predicted bankruptcies
would result from such a program and this, the association
concluded, would be widespread among smaller and weakly financed
companies. Therefore, business would be left in the clutches
of the larger enterprises and in this manner monopolies would
be fostered.
It will be noted that these arguments assume that there
will be no increase in productivity, that production or total
output is fixed. While labor has assumed that on account of
technological progress and more efficient workers, production
will increase, the employers, for the most part, have assumed
just the opposite. This, it appears, is the crux of the entire
argument. During the first World War and the years immediately
following, the National Industrial Conference Board made a
2T. Ibid.', p. 12.
25. Ibid., p. 13.
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number of studies of hours and output. An investigation of
the shoe industry concluded that, under given operating condi-
tions, maximum efficiency was impossible under less than a
fifty two hour week. Reports on the wool and silk industries
fixed the point of maximum output of silk factories between
fifty and fifty-four hours a week. For wool plants in general
it was stated that reduction to a fifty-four hour schedule in-
27
volved a loss of output. These and other reports by the
board showed that a reduction of hours of labor would neces-
sarily impose a reduction in output. These studies indicate
the basis upon which employer's reasoning concerning shorter
hours has been founded.
In 1935 the Black Thirty-Hour Bill was bitterly opposed
by management and the Retailers National Council appeared before
the Senate Judiciary Committee and declared
"That the bill would deal a
body blow to recovery through
its adverse effects on retail
trade and consumer purchasing
power. The bill, the council
predicted, would increase the
costs of goods to the public
by at least twenty five per-
cent and would freeze all
weekly incomes, thus penal-
izing higher grade employees
.
When the American Federation of Labor demanded that all
£6 . National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report
Number 7 t (Boston, 1918)pp. 50-52.
27. National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report
Number 12
,
(Boston, 1918) pp. 44-46.
28. Boston Transcript, Feb. 16, 1935.
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industry be placed on a thirty-hour basis in 1934, Henry I.
Harriman president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States opposed such a demand because the increased leisure
would lower the plane of living and as such, he felt would
be a step backward.
^
The New York Times in an editorial in 1938 reflecting the
views of management on the forty-hour week stated:
n Implicit in a forty-hour week
as a present objective is the
fallacious idea that there is
a fixed volume of production
to be turned out that there is
therefore a fixed number of
working man-hours to go around;
and if individual hours are re-
stricted, there must be a larger
number of jobs. Actually, in
the long run a standard working
week reduced below the point
necessary to maintain health and
efficiency can only mean reduced
production - in other words, a
smaller supply of goods and con-
sequently lower living standards
all around the circle. "30
Although most of the arguments thus far quoted have been
taken from management's debate against the six-hour day and
five-day week, similar arguments were used against the eight-
hour day, the forty-eight and forty-hour week. It has been a
characteristic of the employers to be decidedly repetitious in
their arguments. This is probably due to the fact that they
29. Boston Transcript, Dec. 8, 1934.
30. New York Times, May 26, 1938.
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have always opposed hours reductions on the same basic grounds
,
namely output will decrease and costs will increase.
In actual practice, there have been a few firms who have
not only accepted reductions in hours of work, but have claimed
advantages were gained by such action. For example, the Kel-
logg Company of Battle Creek, Michigan after instituting a six-
hour day and employing four shifts per day instead of the form-
er three eight-hour shifts reported favorable results. The
firm discovered that the overhead decreased, production in-
creased, the number of employees increased by 20 per cent,
and the base rate of the lowest paid employees was increased
by one third. However, day wages for the higher paid workers
were reduced, although their base rate was increased one
eighth. Nevertheless, the company pointed out that although
the reduction had proved beneficial to their firm on account of
its continuous process operations, it would not be practicable
32for every type of business.
Another example of voluntary reduction of hours on the
part of an employer is the famous case of Henry Ford. In 1928
he made the five-day week the basic work week for his employees.
At the time, this was a sensational development and caused
much comment. Mr. Ford felt that the five-day week was a
31. New York Times, April 26, 1931.
32. Ibid.
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natural outgrowth of increased production and that the added
leisure would stimulate demand and, thus, enhance consump-
tion. 33 Nevertheless, most employers have regarded hours of
work reductions at most to be relief expediencies during a
depression period, as the nineteen thirties.
Although there are a few examples of employers granting
a reduction of hours to their workmen, for the most part, op-
position has been the rule rather than the exception. Through-
out the history of the labor movement in the United States, the
employers have resisted all shorter hour movements on that
basis that leisure would create vice, output would be lowered,
costs would rise and that in general any reduction in hours
would be detrimental to the economy.
Summary and Conclusion
As we know, the hours of work in the United States have
been steadily reduced throughout the last hundred years.
Nevertheless, the general reduction has not been gained with-
out struggle nor without argumentation. Workmen have sought
more leisure in order to improve their lot as individuals and
as citizens and also to enhance their efficiency as workers.
Employers have countered that added leisure would reduce ef-
ficiency and impair the morals of workmen. As a matter of fact
it is not necessary to repeat the arguments offered by both
groups. Obviously, each side is convinced of its righteousness
33. Lamar T. Beman, Op. Cit
.
p. 55.
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However, we should recognize the fundamentals of the argumen-
tation. First and foremost is the question of productivity.
To my mind, this can only be determined within the individual
firm by trial. This, at least, it seems may be determined in
a scientific manner. In the next chapter we shall discuss the
relation between productivity and shorter hours and reach a
more definite answer to this basic problem. Linked directly
to the resultant productivity of shorter hours is the prospect
of employment and output and, thus, the whole problem revolves
around this concept.
And finally, the moral and qualitative aspects of shorter
hours are not easily defined. Many examples could be cited
to bolster both labor’s and management’s arguments. These
appear to be a device to win public sympathy and must be ac-
cepted with this in mind.
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CHAPTER IV
Economic Implications of Shorter Hours
On account of the importance of the effect of shorter
hours upon productivity, it is of prime importance for us to
examine the relationship between the two. While seeking to
establish a casual relationship between the hours of work
and productivity, there is no attempt to diminish the import-
ance of other factors such as innovation, managerial efficiency,
or capital investment and their effects upon productivity.
Nevertheless, it is not within the scope of this thesis to
analyze these factors.
As a matter of fact, the second part of this chapter
consists of a statistical and theoretical treatment of the
distribution of the gains of increased productivity. The in-
creasing productivity which our economy has experienced has
been due to many causes, including innovations, managerial
efficiency, capital investment and in part to increased effic-
iency of labor. Distribution of this increased productivity
is important, for it may result in more leisure and effect
employment and output.
Therefore, this chapter is divided into two sections.
The first part is entitled: Productivity and the Hours of
Work and part two is: The Distribution of the Gains of
Increased Productivity.
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I. Productivity and the Hours of Work
In an attempt to establish a norm by which we may judge
the advisability of shortening the hours of work, it is nec-
essary to examine the relation of productivity to the hours of
work. Although there are other criteria such as the social
advisability of shorter hours, it is the purpose of the first
part of this chapter to examine the former relationship.
In order to study this relationship logically, it must
be noted that the time element is only one factor among many
and cannot be wholly isolated from the large number of others,
all of which may have a bearing upon productivity. To arrive
at sound conclusions, therefore, it is necessary to recognize
all of the factors involved. Among these factors are: the
character of the work performed, wages and systems of wage
payment, personnel of the workers, and changes in the production
function. Also important considerations are the attitudes of
the workers and local labor conditions. The ideal, of course,
is to isolate all these other factors a,nd examine the effect
of changes in hours of work alone on productivity. A plant,
therefore, cannot be studied, if, during the various periods
to be surveyed, hours were not maintained consistently at
fairly fixed and definite schedules. During these periods the
operations performed by the workers to be studied must remain
essentially unchanged and the number of identical workers
involved must be reasonably large. Obviously, if the nature
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of the work changes materially, and if the composition of the
work is changed, factors other than hours could be responsible
for the changes observed. Moreover, output has to be measur-
able, and records available on hours and output for the groups
to be studied. ^ The task of finding plants which fulfill the
necessary requirements is difficult, for most firms are under-
going one type of change or another. For example. Dr. Kos-
soris, in his study of the hours of work and output, found
that only fifty plants out of eight hundred examined met the
necessary qualifications. 2 Not only was this true, but he
discovered that the lack of records was also an impediment to
research.^
In addition to these requirements a survey of hours of
labor that weekly working schedules must have been altered
substantially, and that the contrasting schedules must have
been in effect long enough, preferably six months or a year,
to permit a valid comparison of worker performance for two
distinct levels of hours.
Before we review the results of the most pertinent studies
we must define some of the terms which are used. The basic
means of obtaining a measure of efficiency by Dr. Kossoris
was by dividing the total weekly output by the total hours
T~, Max D. Kossoris, Hou?s of Work and Output
,
(U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 917, 1947) p. 7.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
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actually worked. Of course, output is the composite result of
4
average hourly output and the number of hours actually worked.
And finally the output input ratio was secured by dividing
the percentage change in output by the percentage change in
hours •
In the first study by Dr. Kossoris, the effects of changes
in hours on output during the 5 day week were examined. The
results showed that in the case of thirty-nine men doing
machine-controlled pace, moderately heavy work that a twenty-
five percent increase in hours (from forty to fifty hours per
week) brought an increase of twenty- three and one half percent
in output. Fifty men doing the same work under the same condi-
tions were found to increase their output eighteen percent
with the same increase in hours.
In these two groups, the output-input ratios show, for
each additional work hour 0.9 and 0.7 of the hourly output
at the lower level of hours resulted. In both these studies,
operations were machine-paced, so that the hours of actual
machine time corresponded fairly closely to the actual working
time •
In eleven other cases of this particular study where
women worked at an operator-controlled pace, the evidence
showed that output depended primarily on the speed and endur-
~4~. lb id
. pp . 6 1 - 6£
.
5. See Appendix, p. 102.
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ance of the operators. In general, the data procured Indicated
that every 3 additional hours of work per week resulted in an
equivalent output increase of only 2 hours. Prom these stud-
ies it may be concluded that for men at moderately heavy work
where the work pace is controlled by the machine, the increase
in output is nearly proportional to the increase in hours.
Nevertheless, for women, at light operator-paced operations,
the effect of lengthening daily hours from 8 to 9 or 9i=r, and
weekly hours from 40 to 46 or 47, is a drop in weekly efficien-
cy of 4 to percent.
7
Following the above study. Dr. Kossoris examined the ef-
fects of increasing work days from 5 to 6 with no change in
daily hours. 9 He discovered that the effects on efficiency
of this lengthening in weekly hours in the moderately heavy
work groups were nearly evenly divided: in three instances
the addition of the sixth day resulted in decreases of effi-
ciency, and in five it resulted in increases. The changes
were not markedly large in either group, and he concluded that
the addition of a sixth day without increasing daily hours had
no adverse effect on efficiency. The same result was true of
the seven cases where light work prevailed.
For the entire fifteen cases it was determined that output
Max. D. Kossoris, Hours of Work and Output, p. 10.
7. Ibid. p. 11.
8. See Appendix, p. 103.
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during the longer workweek increased directly with the increase
in weekly hours. Thus, these studies indicate that the ad-
dition of a sixth day had no disadvantageous effect on output,
Q
provided daily hours were held to 8 per day.
After the above study. Dr. Kossoris examined the effects
on output when the workdays were decreased from 6 to 5 with
again no change in daily hours.^ Under these conditions,
it was found that efficiency increased in all eighteen cases
which included heavy, moderately heavy and light work. More-
over, weekly output also increased where the work was heavy.
The general conclusions which may be drawn from the five day
week versus the six day week with no changes in daily hours
are these: there is no question, except for heavy work, a
regular 6 day week results in greater output than is produced
during the five day week. The case studies made by Dr. Kos-
soris indicate that, as a rule, light operations can be car-
ried on during the 6 day week at the same efficiency as during
the 5 day week, and that the additional output is almost in
direct proportion to the additional hours worked. On the other
hand, when hours are reduced after a sixth day had been worked
for a protracted period of time, the 5 day week proved more
efficient in terms of hourly output than was the 6 day week."^
Max D. Kossoris, Hours of Work and Output, p.14.
10. See Appendix, p. 104.
11. Max D. Kossoris, Hours of Work and Output
, p. 14.
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In another study in which 22 cases were examined, it was
found that with increases in daily and weekly hours for a six
day week that more output resulted, but the increase in weekly
hours rarely was matched by a proportionate increase in out-
put. 12 The only instances in which this did occur involved
instances of managerial improvements. Generally, the ratio
of the equivalent of output hours gained to additional hours
worked was about 0.6 or 0.7, indicating that 3 hours of work
were required to produce the output of 2 hours at the shorter
schedules. In terms of labor cost, at overtime rates, this
means about 4^- hours pay for 2 hours of additional output.
As a general conclusion to these studies made by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics it may be said that the longer
schedules resulted in larger output. In only a few instances
were lengthened hours so long that no increase in output re-
sulted. However, the longer hours yielded higher output at a
regressive rate. As hours went up, the proportionate return
decreased, and unit labor cost increased. Thus, as hours were
decreased, efficiency improved and in most cases output per
hour or productivity increased. Prom these studies, Mr. Kos-
soris concludes that:
" everything else being equal,
the eight hour day and forty hour
week are best in terms of efficiency
and that higher levels of hours
are less satisfactory.”^
Aside from these studies made by the Bureau of Labor
IS
. i3ee Appendix, p. lOTT
Max^D. Kossoris, Hours of Work and Output, p. 26.
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Statistics, the National Industrial Conference Board has also
conducted research in the relationship of hours of work and
output. Obtaining its data by sending questionnaires to
individual firms, the Board made studies of five industries,
boot and shoe manufacturing, cotton manufacturing, metal
manufacturing, silk manufacturing, and wool manufacturing. In
an effort to isolate the effects of shorter hours alone on
productivity, they required information concerning any other
changes that may have taken place during the period considered.
For example, each firm was asked whether or not they had made
any revisions in piece rates, in hourly rates of time workers,
in method of wage payment, in type or speed of machinery, in
number of machines tended by one operator, in standard or
required production, in regulations affecting punctual or full-
time attendance and any other important changes. 16
It should be noted at this point, that the National Ind-
ustrial Conference Board was primarily interested in ascertain-
ing the effects on total weekly output by shortening hours.
Thus, its studies do not attempt, for the most part, to make
any measurement of the changes in hourly productivity. As a
matter of fact, some of their studies appear to be unsuitable
for their intended purpose, for there are other variables
present besides the hours of labor. 16 In the wool, cotton, and
15. National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report
Number 27
,
(Boston, 1920) p. 15.
16. Ibid,, pp. 13-14.
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silk industries, climate conditions affect the ease of making
cloth and similar climatic periods were not always compared.
Furthermore, during the periods studied there were changes
in styles; this was true of the boot and shoe industry as
well. Thus, although s imilar products were produced in each
period examined, the goods should have been identical in order
to reach legitimate conclusions. Moreover, to my mind, some
of the intervals under consideration were far too short to
allow the real effects of shorter hours to show clearly. In
some instances time periods of only six weeks or two months
were compared.
Recognizing the above inadequacies, it has been necessary
to exclude many of the Board’s studies and to utilize only
those which most nearly fulfill the requirements of an honest
comparison. Among the studies which are pertinent is that of
a large broad-silk mill which reduced hours from fifty-five
to fifty per week in 1916 and found that a 9.1 per cent
reduction in working time was accompanied by an increase of
1 7
7.3 per cent in hourly productivity. Thus, in this partic-
ular case the shortening of hours brought about increased
productivity upon the part of the workers.
In a comparison of the results of reducing the work week
17. National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report
Number 16, (Boston, 1919) p. 31.
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from fifty-four hours to fifty by a machinery establishment
in 1912, it was determined that hourly output was increased
by 8.5 per cent. In this particular study the total number of
18
employees included was two hundred and sixty.
The 7500 employees of the W. H. McElwain Shoe Company
worked fifty-five hours per week in 1916, and this was reduced
to fifty-two hours per week in 1917. The seven shoe factories
of this company, it was found, experienced an increase in
productivity under the shorter schedule. The daily productive
unit per employee rose from 8.91 under the longer schedule to
9.00 for the first two months under the shorter schedule and
to 9.02 for the succeeding two months, an increase of 1.3 per
.
19
cent •
Prom these case studies it is obvious that shortening the
hours of work has increased productivity. As has been empha-
sized previously every effort has been made to divorce from
these surveys any other factors effecting productivity. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume the validity of the conclusions.
Aside from these studies concerning American productivity
and the hours of work, there have been similar studies in other
countries which confirm our finding. H. M. Vernon, a member
of the British Health of Munitions Workers Committee, estab-
187
19.
National Industrial Conference Board,
Number 18, (Boston, 1919) p. 22.
National Industrial Conference Board,
Number 7, (Boston, 1918) p. 34.
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lished the fact that output of workers in the munitions indust-
ry employed on a fifty-five and one half hour week was "con-
20
siderably greater” than on a sixty hour week basis.
Other studies made at the Zeiss Optical Works indicated
that a reduction of hours from nine to eight, with all other
factors remaining constant, induced an increase in productivity.
Furthermore, at the Engis Chemical Works in Belgium, workers
employed on an eight hour shift produced as much as they had
21
under a twelve hour shift.
Not only is it true that a reduction in the hours of
work have contributed to increased productivity, but all factors
which affect output have combined to increase the productivity
of our nation. Actually the increase in our national product-
22ivity has been little less than phenomenal. An index of
output per man-hour of selected industries (1923-1940) indicates
that productivity had risen sixty per cent over the base period,
1923-1925. 23
Thus, not only has reduction in the hours of labor caused
increased productivity, but aside from this direct cause and
effect relationship, productivity per man-hour, due in part to
20. Philip Taft, Economics and Problems of Labor
,
(New York;
Stackpole and Heck, Inc., 1948) p. 3T53.
21. Ibid.
22. E.E. Hagen and N.B. Kirkpatrick, The National Output of
Full Employment
,
American Economic Review, Sept. 1944.
23. See Appendix, p. 106.
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more efficient management and technological advances has in-
creased at a rapid pace. There arises from these facts the
theoretical problem of the distribution of gains of increased
productivity. Therefore, the second part of this chapter is
devoted to this consideration.
II. The Distribution of Gains of Increased Productivity
As a result of increased man-hour productivity in indust-
ry, it is of practical and theoretical importance to dedicate
a portion of this thesis to the distribution of the gains of
increased productivity. It is of practical importance because
such a distribution mirrors the results of a capitalistic
economy and affects all individuals according to their status
as a worker, consumer, or owner of productive resources. Its
theoretical importance revolves around the possibility that a
study of the distribution of the gains of increased product-
ivity may lead to a theory of employment or, at least, to a
segment of such a theory. Therefore, we shall first study
briefly the distribution of gains statistically and in a later
section examine the theoretical implications.
Spurgeon Bell, under the auspices of the Brookings Insti-
tution, has made an investigation of productivity, wages, and
national income. The purpose of the study was to examine the
''relation between the expansion of productive efficiency and
24
the income of the wage earning population.” For our purpose,
?4. Spurgeon Bell, Produc't ivity
.
Wages
,
National Income
(Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1940) p.4.
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the study is important because he traces the distribution of
gains of increased productivity to the several participants
in the productive process and also to the consuming public.
In the past, most economists, assuming perfect competition,
believed that all the gains from increasing productivity would
automatically be bestowed upon the consumers in the form of
lower prices. With the rise of ”big business” and the con-
sequent monopolistic aspects which have entered the economy,
there has arisen a strong belief that all these gains are
appropriated by those who furnish capital. On the other hand,
the relatively recent growth of power on the part of labor
has indicated to many that labor has become the recipient of
the gains of increased productivity. Setting aside these
notions, Spurgeon Bell has made a statistical study of busi-
ness data in order to obtain the facts concerning the effects
of increasing productivity upon the several potential benefi-
ciaries
It was determined in the study that from 1923-24 to 1936-
37 that productivity increased 50 per cent in manufacturing,
89 per cent in mining, 43 per cent in railroads, and 11.1 per
26
cent in the electric light and power industry. This tre-
mendous increase in productivity meant that progressively less
labor was required to obtain a given volume of output. Bell
25. Ibid., p. 5.
26. Ibid., p. 167
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attributes this increase in productivity to the installation of
improved capital instruments and to organizational changes
27
which have economized the use of labor* Actually in some
cases, greater efficiency on the part of labor due to shorter
hours has contributed to the process. It must be remembered
that it is impossible to measure statistically the precise
extent to which any one of these factors contributes to in-
creased productivity. The available data tell us only that
the man-hours required to perform a given amount of work has
been greatly decreased.
In his analysis, Spurgeon Bell discovered that the gains
of increased productivity which accrued to labor, during the
period 1923-1924 and 1936-1937, were chiefly in the form of
no
increased leisure. Although it was determined that workers
received progressively higher rates of pay, aggregate money
wages nevertheless declined. In the manufacturing industries,
railroads, mineral industries, and the electric light and power
industry, the combined hourly earnings increased over the period
(1923-1924 and 1936-1937) by 11.3 per cent, ranging from 1.7
per cent, in the mineral industries to 30.2 per cent in the
electric light and power industry. It is thus, ” apparent
that a substantial portion of the gains was expected to accrue
directly to the benefit of labor.” 29
27T* Ibid., p. 174
28. Ibid., p. 176
29. Ibid., p. 177
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Nevertheless, the man-hours of employment declined, and,
hence, the aggregate money earnings actually decreased. In
some instances, workers received less because of the shorten-
ing of the work week to allow more workers to be employed. Of
course, in such instances, the gains accrued were in the form
of more leisure. Bell estimates that the imputed gains to
labor, considering the rates of pay as well as the hours of
work, amounted to 1,086 million dollars in manufacturing, 150
million dollars in railroads, and 50 million dollars in the
31
electric light and power industry.
As far as earnings on capital investment were concerned
there was a decline over the period as a whole. The amount of
return on the total capital invested in manufacturing, rail-
roads, and electric light and power industries combined declin-
ed 392 million dollars. This amounted to a decrease of 7.7
per cent. Bell states that the rate of return on capital,
which includes interest, rent, dividends, and undistributed
earnings, decreased from about 6.4 per cent in 1923-1924 to
32
approximately 5.6 per cent in 1936-1937.' Had there been no
increase in productivity the decline in the return to capital
might have been much greater.
The decline in both aggregate earnings and in aggregate
wages is explained by Bell to be the result of the failure of
30T Ibid.",' p. 173.
31. Ibid., p. 177.
32. Ibid..
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output to increase in hand with productivity
33
The gains distributed to the consumers on account of in-
creased productivity were in the form of real goods and serv-
ices. In other words, the consumers got more goods for the
same amount of money. Bell measured the gains accruing to
consumers in connection with the purchase of manufactured com-
modities to be 5,055 million dollars during the period 1923-
24 to 1936-37. Likewise during the same interval the consumer
gains in railroad service amounted to 556 million dollars.
And the gains accruing to the users of electric current amount
ed to 463 million dollars. It should be noted that wage and
salaried employees and contributors of capital in their capac-
ity as consumers showed in these gains. Furthermore, in many
cases the quality of the commodity or the service rendered was
improved.
Thus, we have noted the results of the study by Spurgeon
Bell, and it gives us an idea of the actual distribution of
the gains of increased productivity during the period under
consideration. Now there remains the theoretical problem of
the distribution of these gains.
The theory of the distribution of the gains of increased
productivity concerns itself primarily with the effects which
such distribution will have upon employment and output. Basic
33. Ibid,, p. 178
34. Ibid.
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*>
to the theoretical discussion of the problem, there are certain
assumptions which we must make. First, we assume that the
firm has a price policy. Secondly, we assume that the firm
has some control over wage rates. Thirdly, we assume that the
firm is in long run equilibrium, and thus all factors are free
to vary. Fourthly, we assume there is an increase in product-
ivity which causes costs to fall 10 per cent. And lastly we
assume that there is no change in prices. It is very import-
ant to note that there is no assumption concerning the maxi-
mization of profits. Furthermore, perfect competition is
eliminated because if that were true, all the gains of increas-
ed productivity would accrue to the consumers in the form of
lower prices •
At the outset let us consider the results, if all the
gains of increased productivity are distributed to the workers.
As long as we remain within the frame work of our model, such
a distribution with a 10 per cent increase in productivity will
cause employment to fall by 10 per cent while wage rates are
increased by 10 per cent. Thus, the total payroll will remain
the same, the volume of sales will remain the same and profits
are the same as before. The attempt to pass all the gains to
the workers results in a decrease in employment, either in the
form of increased leisure (shorter hours) or in unemployment
because the same output and price is maintained. It should
35. Norman J. Silberling, The Dynamics of Business
,
(New York;
Mcgraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.
,
19437 p. 510.
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66 .
be further noted that these conditions would allow no increase
in total purchasing power because the 10 per cent increase in
wage rates is exactly offset by unemployment. In other words
the increased purchasing power in the hands of employed workers
is completely counteracted by the decrease in purchasing power
suffered by discharged workers. Therefore, there would be no
possibility of increased employment in other areas due to the
effects of more purchasing power.
Now let us examine the results when all the gains are
distributed to the consumers. Under these circumstances neces-
sarily there would be a 10 per cent fall in the price of the
goods because this is the method by which the gains may be
distributed to the consumers. At the same time, wage rates
would remain the same as would profits. Depending upon the
elasticity of demand for the product, employment would de-
crease, increase, or remain constant, and this is also true of
the payroll and the volume of sales. If the demand for the
product were highly elastic, the volume of sales would increase
'T C
and in this manner employment and output would be s t imulated. 1'
It is also possible that the demand faced by a particular firm
could be inelastic, and a price decline would not call forth an
increase in output sufficient to maintain employment. Thus,
the results of the distribution of gains to consumers depends
36 . Sumner H. Slichter, Implications of the Shorter Hour
Movement
,
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science,
Jan., 1934, p. 442.
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upon the elasticity of demand for the product.
Although a reduction in price may not always bring an
immediate stimulus to demand in the firm, there can be no
doubt that a price reduction is a "positive inducement" to the
increase of demand for a product. 37 Furthermore, if the price
decline did not bring about an increase of sales for the firm,
the increased purchasing power would be available for purchas-
ing other commodities, stimulating employment elsewhere.
Lastly, let us examine the results if all the gains are
absorbed by the owners of the firm, or capital. In this case,
the gains accruing from a 10 per cent reduction in costs would
mean that while wage rates, prices, and volume of sales would
remain the same, employment would fall by 10 per cent as would
the payroll. If we define profits as the difference between
total revenue and total costs, then a 10 per cent decrease in
costs will increase profits. By whatever that actual amount
of decrease happens to be, in this particular case, output
remains the same and employment declines. Purchasing power
would be unchanged because the gain by capital would be ac-
companied by an equal loss to the discharged workers.
37. Spurgeon Bell, Productivity
,
Wages
,
National Income p. 183,
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DISTRIBUTION OF THE GAINS OF INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY *
All the
gains to:
T
L Workers Consumers OwnersjEmploy-
ment
Wage Rates Payroll Prices Volume of
Sales
Profits
l-workers
—
-10*
\ .
+ 10$
1
1
[
1
Same
y
Same Same
l
Same
.
2.
cons umers
!
Same +? i -io$
: y
f
i
+ (>10*?)
!
i
i
*
Same
11
3. \l
owners : -10$
o
Same
Jl
i
Same Same
1
1
+ (>10*?)
i
-«* So that costs fall by 10 per cent.
In conclusion, this analysis indicates that the distri-
bution of gains resulting from increased productivity either
to workers or to owners entirely is not desirable as far as
employment and output are concerned. Only when the savings
are distributed to the consumers in the form of lower prices,
and if the demand for the product is elastic, employment and
output will increase. Furthermore, from this analysis it may
be concluded that workers and the owners of capital will in
the long run benefit from such distribution. Obviously, labor
is interested in the expansion of aggregate production and ag-
gregate employment, and Bell concludes from his statistical
analysis that when the total volume of production increases,
the wages share expands, and that when total production
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declines, the share of labor decreases. Capital, too, will
benefit, for a reduction in prices which stimulates an ex-
pansion of demand is conducive to the greater employment of
capital and to an increase in the demand for additional capi'
tal
.
38
38. Ibid., p. 184.
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CONCLUSIONS
From the first chapter of this thesis it is obvious that
the hours of work in the United States have been substantially
reduced since the first strike for the ten-hour day in 1791.
Commonly, the system of work was from "sun to sun” as taken
from agriculture. Gradually, as the labor movement gained
strength, its power is reflected in the reduction of hours.
This struggle which was at first centered on the ten-hour day
was not without toil and bloodshed. Although all workers agreed
that the hours of work should be shortened, there was little
harmony concerning the methods of attaining the goal.
As the struggle for the ten-hour day passed into history,
and the eight-hour movement took its place, the problem for
the labor movement was still one of method. Should shorter
hours be legislated into existence, or should economic forces
be applied directly against the employers to gain shorter
hours? The American Federation of Labor stood staunchly by
the economic method. However, gains were registered by both
methods
.
With the advent of World War I, hours of work were short-
ened perceptibly. After the war, gains continued to be made,
but to a less degree. When the depression of 1837 gripped the
country, the hours of labor were reduced greatly as the "spread
the work" attitude gained strength. However, the threat of
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war and, finally war itself forced an increase in the actual
hours of work so that the huge material needs could be met.
At the war’s end, a reduction of hours may be noted, but it
was not large on account of the pent up demand for peacetime
goods and services.
The reasoning of management and labor concerning shorter
hours has been both social and economic in nature. Workman
have sought more leisure in order to improve their lot as
individuals and as citizens; to enhance their efficiency as
workers, to reduce sickness due to fatigue, to stem unemploy-
ment, to increase consumption in line with production and to
counteract low wages. On the other hand, management has count-
ered that increased leisure would lead to vice; it would cause
prices to rise; it would lower the standard of living; it
would create unemployment; it would impose a shortage of skill-
labor; it would encourage foreign competition; it would foster
monopolies; and increased leisure would increase bankruptcies.
Although management, in general, has opposed reductions in the
hours of work, there have been some instances where the re-
ductions have been voluntary. Henry Ford is the notable ex-
ample •
Underlying the theories for shorter hours advanced by
labor, is the belief that shorter hours will increase product-
ivity. Management, has based its arguments on the opposite as-
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->
sumption, that productivity will be lowered with a decrease
in hours. Thus, in order to evaluate these fundamental as-
sumptions, the last chapter of the thesis was dedicated to
productivity and the hours of work.
Finally, the moral arguments concerning shorter hours are
not easily defined. Many examples could be cited to strengthen
both labor’s and management’s arguments. These moral aspects
appear to have been a device with which to win public sympathy
and should be accepted in their proper light.
Although it is not possible to state exactly what the
optimum work week should be as far as productivity is concern-
ed, certain conclusions may be drawn from the relationship of
productivity to the hours of work. Granted that it is diffi-
cult to ascertain the effects of hours of work alone on pro-
ductivity, it may be concluded that in most cases reductions in
the hours of labor have caused productivity per man-hour to
increase in certain firms which have been studied. Aside
from this fact, productivity per man-hour, due to all causes
has increased greatly in the United States. Thus, the next
problem which arises is that of the distribution of the gains
of increased productivity.
This study indicated that the distribution of all gains
of increased productivity either to workers or owners not de-
sirable as far as employement and output is concerned. Only
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when the gains are distributed to the consumers in the form of
lower prices, and if the demand for the product is elastic,
will employment and output increase. However, the owners of
capital and the workers will benefit from such distribution
because labor always seeks employment and increased output
will enhance the demand for capital and increase its uses.
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APPENDIX I
Problems Involved In the Computation of an Index of Hours
In order to complete the study of the shorter hour’s
movement in the United States, it is appropriate that we ex-
amine index numbers of hours and point out the problems in-
volved in their computation. To gain an understanding of
these problems, it is necessary to define what is meant by
an index number which make it a useful statistical device.
An index number may be defined as a statistical device
used in measuring relative changes or difference in the mag-
nitude of statistical groups or aggregates of variables.
1
An index number, then, is used to compute the average percent-
age change of a statistical group from one point of time to
another. Usually, index numbers are thought of in connection
with prices, but an index number can be calculated for wages,
for quantities of goods imported or exported, and, in fact for
any subject matter involving divergent changes of a group of
2
magnitudes. Thus, it is possible to compute an index of the
hours of work.
In order for an index number to be of practical use there
are several qualifications which the data must fulfill. First,
Robert Emmet Chaddock, Princ iples and Methods of Statistics
,
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1^25 ) p. 175.
2. Irving Fisher, The Making of Index Numbers
,
(New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922 ) p. 3.
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the relative change which is measured over time should be
for the same commodity or article at each period of time.
Thus, if we were computing a price index of wheat, we would
have to be careful to measure the same grade and quality of
wheat for each period. If different grades were used in each
time period, the same item would not be the subject through-
out. In such a case, the index would serve no useful purpose.
Not only should the data be comparable, but they must be ac-
4
curate and the sample representative. Accuracy is an obvious
ly important qualification, and there is no need to amplify
this requirement. Since the data for index numbers are usually
obtained from samples, a sample should be obtained that be-
haves like the group from which it is drawn. That is, in
selecting the representative commodity for each group, the
primary object is to choose a commodity, the behavior of which
is fairly typical of the group from which it is selected.
Next, the selection of a base is of moment in the computation
of index numbers. It is customary to select some period of
time as a base for comparison. A month is too short a period
to use as a base period, since any one month is likely to be
unusual on account of accidental or seasonal influences. A
year, however, is often used. Nevertheless, the base year
should be one that is "normal.” Therefore, the year used as
3. Warren Milton Persons, The Construction of Index Numbers
,
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, T9"S8) pi. 59.
4. Frederick E. Croxton and Dudley J. Cowden, Applied General
Statistics
, (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
,
1939 J p. 582.
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a basis of comparison must be one that during which there is
5
relatively little fluctuation.
Finally, the choice of weights is an important factor in
the computation of index numbers. If each item in the series
is not given its proper weight, the resultant index number
may be either too large or too small. Therefore, each item
must be properly weighted so that the index number will be
g
able to represent its proper importance.
Having defined index numbers and outlined the qualities
of a good index number, we now examine the problems peculiar
to the computation of index numbers of the hours of work and
study some indices which have been computed.
At first, one might imagine that an index number of hours
could be easily computed because an ”hour M is a unit easy to
define and agree on. Nevertheless, this is not the case, be-
cause there are many other factors besides the unit of time
which enter such an index. As has already been stated, the
same commodity or article should be used for each period of
time. Thus, in index numbers of the hours of work the content
of the job should be identical throughout the series. But
this is impossible to assume, for as changes In the production
function occur overtime, the content of jobs changes accord-
ingly. In almost every industry that can be enumerated, the
jfl Ibid., p. 586.
6. Edmund E. Day, Statistical Analysis
,
(New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1925) p. 351.
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content of the jobs within it has altered with the passing of
the years. To mention but a few, carpenters have rapidly be-
come assemblers with the advent of the prefabrication technique
in building. The diesel engines on our railroads have changed
the composition of the work of engineers and firemen. The
glass industry has witnessed the transition from the human
glassblower to machines performing the same work. The content
of the work in the automobile industry has been altered con-
siderably with the advent of the assembly line production
method. It would not be difficult to find similar changes
in any industry. Thus, the content of the job is not identical
throughout an index numbers of hours of work over a period of
time
.
Not only is this true, but if an index adheres to a given
list of jobs, as time passes new jobs will be omitted. On the
other hand, we find many indices of hours are computed for
industries as a whole. In this instance, as different jobs
are conceived and others dropped within the industry, there
can be no attempt to maintain a given list of jobs under these
circumstances. Therefore, the initial problem in the compu-
tation of an index of hours is the problem concerning the
ability to attain identical job content and identical jobs.
Furthermore, it is impossible to determine the intensity
of work from an index of hours. It is purely a quantitative
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measurement and contains no quality elements. Thus, although
an index of hours may show a reduction in hours worked this
does not necessarily mean that work is less arduous. For
example, although the hours of work have been reduced in the
automobile industry, this does not indicate that the assembly
line technique has made work easier than was the case under
longer hours. Perhaps, the tempo of work has been speeded up.
Other inadequacies of indices of hours include the fact
that they do not inform us what the pattern of work has been.
Thus, the data may include hours of split shifts, swing shifts,
or day and night employment. This could easily effect job
content and intensity of work. Moreover, if the index happens
to be one of daily hours, the length of the work-week is com-
pletely unknown. On the other hand, it is not always possible
to discover, from data showing the number of hours worked per
week, the number of days worked. Thus, a fifty-five hour week
could mean a five-day week of eleven hours per day or a six-
7
day week of ten hours per day.
With this general background of the problems involved in
the computation of index numbers of hours, let us now examine
some individual indices of hours.
Ti Carroll R. Dougherty, Labor Problems in Ame rlcan Industry
,
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941 ) p. 191
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INDEX OF THE AVERAGE HOURS PER DAY OF LABOR, 1840-1889
(1889=100)
Year Index
—
j
Year Index
1840 114 .• 1865 107
1841 105 1866 108
1842 114 1867 108
1843 115 1868 106
1844 116 1869 106
1845 115 1870 105
1846 114 1871 105
1847 115 1 1872 105
1848 113 1873 105
1849 112 [1874 105
1850 115 1875 103
1851 114 5 1876 103
1852 112 1877 103
1853 113 1878 103
1854 111 1879 103
1855 111 1 1880 103
1856 110 11881 103
1857 109 11882 103
1858 110 \ 1883 103
1859 111
f
1884 103
1860 110 1 1885 103
1861 109 1886 102
1862 108 1887 100
1863 108 1888 100
1864 108 ] 1889 100
Source: U. S. Senate, Aldrich Report, Wholesale Prices
,
and
Wages
,
and Transportation, 1840-1889.
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This series as taken from the Aldrich report on wholesale
prices, wages, and transportation covers twenty-one industries
from 1840 to 1889. The base year is 1889, and since the 1889
average was 10.0 hours per day exactly, the index numbers in-
dicate the absolute as well as the relative length of the work-
ing day.
At best, this series of index numbers can only give us a
crude idea of the length of the working day during the period.
This is true for a number of reasons. First, according to the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, which had a hand in its computation:
11 the Aldrich report, because
of the long period covered, was
more often a case of getting such
figures as could be obtained than
in getting the figures that were
wanted. "8
Secondly, the figures refer to "certain picked" establishments
where it is probable, on account of union efforts, shorter
hours made an earlier appearance than in the mass of workshops.^
Thus, although the figures may be accurate, we cannot be sure
that they are representative. Furthermore, there is no indica-
tion that the averages have been weighted by the number employ-
ed in each year. Evidentally a simple arithmetic average was
used in securing the figures.
8. Bureau of Labor Statistics, History of Wages in the United
States from Colonial Times to 1928, Bulletin No. 604, 1$34,
p. 147.
9. Adams & Sumner, Labor Problems
,
(New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1914) p. 517.
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Obviously, the content of the jobs must have changed con-
siderably over the forty-nine year period, for it is an era in
which a large amount of innovation occurred. Unfortunately, it
has been impossible to discover the nature of the 21 industries
included in the index, and thus no real estimate of this problem
can be made.
It is not clear whether the base year (1889) was chosen
because it was an even 10.0 hours per day, and thus made the
construction of the index relatively easy, or because the year
was believed to be "normal."
In conclusion, this series demonstrates the difficulties
of obtaining data during the earlier periods of our history.
Since poor records were kept for the most part, it is better
to rely upon historical evidence than statistical data to ob-
tain information about the more distant past. Thus, if we ac-
cept this index, it must be with reservations on account of its
inadequacies
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INDEX OF HOURS PER WEEK IN ALL INDUSTRY, 1890-1926-::-
Year Average hours Index Index
per week 1890-1899=100 1914=100
j
1890 58.4 101 109
1891 58.2 100 109
1892 58.2 100 109
1893 58.2 100 109
1894 57.8 100 108
1895 58.1 100 109
1896 57.9 100 108
1897 57.7 99 108
1898 57.6 99 108
1899
1900
57.5 99 107
57.3 99 107
1901 56.8 98 106
1902 56.3 97 105
1903 55.9
i
96 104
1904 55.7 96 104
1905
!
55.7 !
!
96 104
1906 55.3 95 103
1907 55.3
;
95 103
1908 54.9 j 95 103
1909
!
54.9 1 95 103
1910 54 .
6
94 102
1911 54.4 94 102
1912 54.2 93 101
1913 53.8 93 101
1914
|
53.5 92 100
1915 53.5 92 100
1916 53.3 92 100
1917
j
53.0 91 99
1918 52.2 90
88
98
1919
|
51.3 96
1920 50.4 87 94
1921 50.3 87 94
1922 50.5 87 94
1923 50.4 | 87 94
1924 50.0 86 93
1925 49.9 1 86 93
1926 49.8 ;
i 86
t
93
Source: Paiol H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States, 1890-
1926. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1930) p. 208. ^
-"-Standard hours.
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Unlike the previous index of hours Paul H. Douglas* series
may be held in high esteem. It is an index of the standard
hours per week in all industry, and this includes (1) all
manufacturing, (2) the building trades, (3) government employ-
ees, (4) coal miners (anthracite and bituminous) (5) transport-
ation workers (steam railroad employees and seamen), and (6)
unskilled labor. These groups comprised 7.0 million workers
in 1890, 14.9 million in 1922, and 14.0 million in 1926. 10 It
may be noted that the data are quite comprehensive and contain
representative groups.
This index is not one of actual hours worked, but one of
standard hours. In other words, it shows the average number of
hours comprising a full time week in all industry. According
to the phase of the business cycle in which any one year hap-
pens to be, actual hours may be greater or less than standard
hours. During periods of prosperity, actual hours usually ex-
ceed standard hours, while in the depression phase they are
usually less
.
As far as weighting is concerned, Douglas has weighted each
group by the number employed in that group for each particular
year. This is the standard method of weighting an index of
hours, because it assigns to each group its proper importance
in the index. If this method had not been used, it is probable
10. Paul H7 Douglas, Real Wages in the Unit ed States , 1890-
1926
,
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company” 1930 ) p. 204.
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that low or high groups would have exerted undue influence on
the final figures
.
In order to gain a better perspective of the data, two
indices have been computed, one with 1890-99 as the base, and
one having 1914 as the base. The double index is a useful
arrangement, although at first it may appear confusing for it
allows us to view the data from two different points of time.
Moreover, the selection of both bases is good. The period
1890-99 was a stable decade as far as hours were concerned,
and is a fine basis upon which to construct the relative change.
The other base, 1914 is another stable period of time for the
hours of work, coming as it did immediately prior to World War I.
Although the data are complete and the mechanics of the
index good, this index contains the same pitfalls that all
indices of hours do. First of all, it is impossible to assume
that the content of the jobs depicted has remained identical
over time. Also, it should be noted that Douglas has adhered
to a given list of jobs insofar as this is possible within in-
dustrial groups. But in keeping this factor constant, perhaps
some excluded group may have become more important as time
passed.
Douglas notes that, although the index represents appreci-
able gains in leisure.
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’’---they may well be offset
either in whole or in part
by an increased speeding up
of the work and by the re-
quirement of more time in
going to and from work. The
fact that the American people
seem on the average to consume
fewer calories than was the
case several decades ago is
at least some presumptive
evidence to indicate that they
are not expending as much total
physical energy as they form-
erly did.”H
Thus
,
again it is emphasized that an index of hours is
merely a quantitative measurement and quality or intensity of
work is completely outside its sphere.
Finally, this particular index is one of weekly hours,
and no conclusions can be drawn concerning the number of hours
worked per day nor the number of days per week. Nevertheless,
we must evaluate it as a good index even though it contains
some deficiencies. These are almost impossible to overcome
in measuring the relative changes in hours over time.
Tl Ibid., p. 209
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INDEX OF UNION HOURS OF l^BOR M the
UNITED STATES AS OF MAY EACH IffiAR, 1907-1928
(1913=100)
Year Index of hours per full-time week
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
102.6
102.1
101.9
101.1
100.7
100.3
100.0
99.6
99.4
98.8
98.4
97.0
94.7
93.8
93.9
94.4
94.3
93.9
93.0
92.8
92.4
91.9
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, History of Wages in
the United States from Colonial Times To 1928, Bulletin
No. 604, 1954, p. 521.
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The U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has computed these
index numbers of union hours of labor in the United States as
of May each year, 1907 to 1928, with 1913 as the base. This
index includes all union trades in all large cities, except
street-railway motormen, conductors and bus drivers. Natural-
ly, since union trades make up only a portion of our industr-
ial life, this index makes no effort to typify the hours of
work of all workers in the United States. Moreover, union
employees often have a stronger bargaining position than non-
union workers, and so their relative reduction as well as ab-
solute reduction in hours, is probably greater than obtained
by the former group.
Again we may comment on the content of jobs, and the same
criticisms apply to this index as have been stated previously.
The criticism may be qualified regarding this index because
instead of adhering to a given list of industries and cities,
the number of trades and cities included in the data varies
12from year to year. This violates a basic rule of index
numbers which states that identical commodities or items should
be measured from time period to time period. Of course this
criticism should not be interpreted to mean that the Bureau of
Labor Statistics made this variation purposely. In all prob-
ability, it was due to the nature of the sources ("all access-
12^ th S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, History of Wages in The
United States from Colonial Times to 1928, op . c it
. , p . 521
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13
ible sources” were used). At any rate, the composition of
the data changes from year to year and, consequently, the index
numbers suffer from this deficiency.
ITT Ibid., p. 520.
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INDEX OF AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS IN ALL MANUFACTURING, 1909-1947
rr “
(1926-27=100)
Year Average Weekly Hours Index
1909
. - - - - - — - . »_!_ -LliUJJT,
51.0 111.1
1914 49.4 109.8
1919 46.3 102.9
1923 45.6 101.3
1924 43.7 97.1
1925 44.5 98.9
1926
|
45.0 100.0
1927 45.0 100.0
1928 44.4 98.7
1929 44.2 98.2
1930 42.1 93.6
1931 40.5 90.0
1932 38.3 85.1
1933 38.1 84.7
1934 34.6 76.8
1935 36.6 81.3
1936 39.2 87.1
1937 38.6 85.7
1938 35.6 79.1
1939 37.7 83.7
1940 38.1 84.7
1941 40.6 90.2
1942 42.9 95.3
1943 44.9 99.7
1944 45.2 100.4
1945 43.4 96.4
1946 40.4 89.7
1947 40.3
)
89.5
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics, 1947 Edition, Bulletin No. 916, p. 51.
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This last index of hours was computed with data secured
from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The date are the
average weekly hours of work in all manufacturing in the United
States from 1909 to 1947. Included in the sample are approxi-
mately 31,000 establishments employing more than 7 million
workers in the following industries: 1) iron and steel and
their products, 2) electrical machinery, 3) machinery, except
electrical, 4) transportation equipment, except automobiles,
5) automobiles, 6) nonferrous metals and their products,
7) lumber and timber basic products, 8) furniture and finish-
ed lumber products, 9) stone, clay, and glass products, 10)
textile-mill products and other fiber manufactures, 11) ap-
parel and other finished products, 12) leather and leather
products, 13) food, 14) tobacco manufactures, 15) paper and
allied products, 16) printing, publishing and allied industries,
17) chemical and allied products, 18) products of petroleum
and coal, 19) rubber products and 20) miscellaneous industries.
The figures for these industries are for:
’’Production and related workers
including working foremen and
all nonsupervis ory workers (in-
cluding lead men and trainees)
engaged in fabricating, process-
ing assembling, inspection, re-
ceiving, storage, handling, pack-
ing, warehousing, shipping, main-
tenance, repair, janitorial,
watchman services, product develop-
ments, auxiliary production for
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plant’s own use (that is, power
plant ) and record-keeping and
other services closely associ-
ated with the production opera-
tions listed. Excluded are
supervisory employees (above
the working foreman level ) and
their clerical staffs, routemen,
and s alesmen . ”14
Thus, the type of work performed is outlined in detail,
but this adherence to a given list of jobs does not eliminate
changes in the job content over time. Although the same work
may be performed throughout the interval, it may be performed
by different methods at the various time periods. Even in this
series where every effort is made to measure the same commodity
(hours of work) in each year, it is impossible to perform the
task perfectly.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics obtained the primary data
by questionnaires sent to individual firms. These firms were
requested to supply employment and man-hour data for the pay
period ending nearest the 15th of the month. This pay period
was selected to eliminate from the pay period reported the in-
fluence of such factors as national holidays insofar as possi--
15ble . Tabulations were then made by industry, and the averages
of hours were computed in the following manner: Man-hours were
divided by employment, yielding average hours per week. This
figure was affected by absenteeism, turnover, and similar
14 • tn S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics, 1947 Edition, Bulletin No. 916, p. 51.
15. Ibid., p. 52.
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factors, as the employment figure included all persons working
at any time during the pay period. Therefore, these average
hours are actual hours and do not refer to standard hours of
work. To obtain the figure for each year, an average was
computed from the monthly figures. As far as weights are
concerned, the average for each industry was weighted by the
estimated number of productive workers in the industry. It
should be noted that in this series no data were collected for
the following years: 1910, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1915, 1916, 1917,
1918, 1920, 1921, and 1922. So with the exception of 1909,
1914, and 1919 continuous data extend from 1923 to 1947.
As far as it is possible to compute a good index of hours,
these data of the Bureau of Labor Statistic fulfill the quali-
fications .
In conclusion, the problems involved in the computation
of indices of hours should be reviewed briefly. First, a given
list of jobs should remain identical, but in passing over time
the index will omit new jobs, if it adheres to a given list.
The content of the job should be identical for each time period,
but this is impossible to assume. Following these difficulties,
there is the problem of whether a reduction in hours means less
work. But an index of hours is purely a quantitative device,
and no indication of intensity of work performed is manifested.
Furthermore, from data of weekly hours, it is impossible to
ascertain the days or the number of hours per day worked.
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Naturally from daily figures, no estimate of weekly hours can
be derived. Finally, an index number of hours does not indicate
the pattern of work, e.g., figures may include split shifts,
swing shifts, and day or night employment. In addition to
these difficulties peculiar to an hour’s index, all the other
problems of computation of index numbers are included. Thus,
the sample should be representative, the data accurate, the
base "normal”
,
and the proper weights applied.
Although the four indices of hours examined were found
in varying degrees to be deficient in the qualities of a "good”
index, this statement by Joseph A. Schumpeter seems to be apt:
" the old argument of practical
workers that indices tend to give
roughly the same picture, however
well or faultily constructed, con-
tains after all some little element
of truth, which for us, it is be-
lieved, suffices to justify what
we are going to do with them,
provided we watch our step in
drawing conclus ions . "16
16. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Bus iness Cycles
,
(New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939) Vol. II, pp. 459-460.
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APPENDIX II
EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN DAILY AND WEEKLY HOURS ON
EFFICIENCY AND OUTPUT DURING THE FIVE-DAY WEEK
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: Data Assembled
from Hours of Work And Output
,
Bulletin No. 917,
pp. 9-10.
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EFFECTS OF INCREASING WORKDAYS FROM 5 TO 6 PER WEEK,
WITHOUT CHANGES IN DAILY HOURS,
ON EFFICIENCY AND OUTPUT
Type of Work
No. of
Workers
Changes in
Hours of Work-
Per Cent
Change In
Effi-
ciency Output
from to i Hours Output Per Cent
Change
- -
Input
Ratio
Machine-Con-
trolled Pace
Moderately
J
1
|
Heavy 39 50 58
j
416 + 10.1 -2.1 0.6
II 50 50 58 + 16 + 10.2 -1.0 I .6
It
Operator-
Controlled
Pace
Moderately
700 40 48 +20 +21.0 + 1.0
i
1
1.1
Heavy 32
1
40 44.5 +11.3
j
+ 5.9 -1.9 .5
it 21 40 48 +20.0
j
+22.8 +3.5 1.1
it 8 40 48 +20.0 +21.4 + 1.6 1.1
if
! 10 ' 40
j 40
I
50
48 +20.0
+20.0
+16.0
+ 20.8
+ 22.8
+15.1
+ 1.9 1.0
it 14
10
48
58
+3.9
+ .2
1.1
Light 1.0
? 9 1 40 48 + 20 .
0
+ 22 • 8 + 1.4 1.1
ii 8
28
13
5 40 48 j+20.0 +14.9 l - .4 . .8
ii 40 46 j+15.0 ! +10.7 + 1.6
+ .8
1.2
.7
ti
! 40 48 ]+20.0 +20.2 1.0
it 9 1 40 48 1+20.0 +17.9 .9
ii 9 r 48 ? +20 . + 19.3 + 7.3t
—
J
1.0
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: Data Assembled from
Hours of Work And Output
,
Bulletin No. 917, pp. 13-14.
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EFFECTS ON EFFICIENCY OF DECREASING WORKDAYS
FROM 6 TO 5 PER WEEK, WITHOUT
CHANGES IN DAILY HOURS*
Heavy ......
Moderately
Heavy
!!
t»
»»
• •••••
” 1
»»
"
Light
!»
n
M
"
tt
......
:: ;
• ::::::
15
33
18
18
14
21
8
28
28
28
17
25
26
25
9
13
Weekly
Hours Changed
from j to
I
I 60 l 50 |
58 50 l
1
> i
i 58
j
50
i 58 50 j
I 58 50 ;
: 58
|
45-50
I 55 i 50 j
{ 48 i 40 i
: 48 40
48 43 ;
j
46 43
• 48 40 j
j
48 40
48 40 !
• 48 | 40 {
j 48 I 40
f 48 [ 40 ?
48
\
40 ?
i I 1
Efficiency Per
Cent Change
4- 0.7
+ 4.9
411. 2
-5.4
+7.4
49.1
43.0
412.4
416.1
+5.0
42.9
43.7
+12.0
+ 6.9
+5.1
+1.5
+ 7.9
+12.6
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: Data Taken from
Hours of Work And Output
,
Bulletin No. 917, p. 15.
* (Pace controlled by operator)
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EFFECTS OF INCREASING DAILY AND WEEKLY HOURS ON
EFFICIENCY AND OUTPUT, DURING A SIX-DAY WEEK-::-
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: Data Assembled from
Hours of Work And Output, Bulletin No. 917, pp. 24-26.
*«* (Pace controlled by operator)
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INDEX OF OUTPUT PER MANHOUR, SELECTED INDUSTRIES,
UNITED STATES, 1923-1940
(1923-1924=100)
Year
(1)
Output
.
. _
(2)
Manhours
-- - - -
—
— r — —
-
. j
.. _
(3)
Output Per
Manhour
1923 100 106 94
1924 95 96 99
1925 105 99 106
1926 112 103 109
1927 113 100
j
113
1928 117 99 i 118
1929 127 104 122
1930 109 88 124
1931 91 74 123
1932 68 55 124
1933 75 56 134
1934 83 59 I1 141
1935 95 66 144
1936 114 76 150
1937 121 79 / 153
1938 104 65 160
1939 117 78 160
1940 135 81 167
Source: E. E. Hagen and N. B. Kirkpatrick, The National Output
of Full Employment, American Economic Review, Sept-
embers 1944, p . 48 4*
.••OCT
V . .C :
M
I
c
*
•
c:
: r i
.
,
M ’*•'* •' I.O-.K ' . '* C • !
.
v
'
.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems , (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1914,
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings . 1902.
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings . 1926.
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings . 1927.
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings . 1932.
American Federation of Labor, Proceedings . 1937.
Bell, Spurgeon, Productivity
,
Wages
,
National Inc ome
.
(Wash-
ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1940).
Beman, Lamar T., Five Day Week. (New York: The H. W. Wilson
Co., 1928).
Boston Globe, March 23, 1949.
Boston Transcript, December 8, 1934.
Boston Transcript, February 16, 1935.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, History of Wage s in the United
States from Colonial Times to lH£8
,
Bulletin No7 6?) 4 7 1934.
Cahill, Marion Cotter, Shorter Hours
,
(New York: Columbia
University Press, 1^32 )
.
Census of Manufacturers, 1923.
Chaddock, Robert Emmet, Principles and Methods of Statistics
,
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1^25*77
Committee on Work Periods in Continuous Industry, Federated
American Engineering Societies, The Twelve Hour Shift in
Industry
.
Commons, J. R., and Associates, History of Labor in the United
States
,
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1918)
't
•
• . o’ ,1 /V
• . t
t
•
•
O ' T C • »
*
.
— i / ; * »
,
iic
'
‘
• • # i T.tl
• •
*
. t •
.
•
• t , .
0 • . .
• iq
'
'• oi l. .
.
•
Ct/J t . • , ( I
•
:
• t
• J
,
•
‘
. Or," J
* 3l&c .
•
f
r •
. .
•
*
» • • ?
, .
:
•
l
m
e
Commons, J. R.
,
Documentary History of American Industria l
Society . (Glendale, California: The H. Clark Company,
1910T Vol. 6.
Commons, J. R.
,
Documentary History of American Industrial
Society. (Glendale, California: The H. Clark Company,
191b) Vol. 9.
Croxton, Frederick E., and Cowden, Dudley J. , Applied General
Statistics . (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939).
Cummins, E. E., and De Vyver, Frank T., The Labor Problem in
the United States. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company
Inc., 1947).
Day, Edmund E., Statistical Analysis , (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 192517
Dougherty, Carroll R., Labor Problems in American Industry ,
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1§41 FT
Douglas, Paul H., Real Wages in the United States . (Boston and
New York: Houghton MiffTTn Company, 1930)
Extent of the Five Day Week , Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 33.
Fisher, Irving, Bulletin of the Committee of One Hundred on
National Health. (*The National Conservation Commission
1909) .
Fisher, Irving, The Making of Index Numbers . (New York:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922).
Frankfurter, Felix and Goldmark, Josephine, The Case of the
Shorter Workday
.
(National Consumers League^ T3lB7, Vol.l.
Gunton, George, Eight Hour Movement
.
(Washington, D.C.: The
American Federation of Labor, 1889).
Hagen, E. E., and Kirkpatrick, N. B., The National Output of
Full Employment. American Economic Review, September,
1944.
Harris, Herbert, American Labor
,
(New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1938)
T„ i •
• •
i
. <
*
.
;
•'
. V '
'
«, *
,
'
•'
'
t
.
«
'
•
• • t
Kossoris, Max D., Hours of Work and Output > (United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 917, 1947)
Kossoris, Max D. , Studies of the Effects of Long Working Hours .
(United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
No. 791-A, October 17, 1944).
Lester, Richard A., Economics of Labor . (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 194^1.
Millis, Harry A., and Montgomery, Royal E. , Labors Progress
and Some Basic Labor Problems . (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company Inc
.,
1938 )
.
National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report Number 7.
(Boston, 1918 ) .
National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report Number 12.
(Boston, 1918).
National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report Number
16. (Boston, 1919).
National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report Number
18. (Boston, 1919).
National Industrial Conference Board, Research Report Number
27. (Boston, 1920).
New York Times, April 26, 1931.
New York Times, May 26, 1938.
Persons, Warren Milton, The Construction of Index Numbers .
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928 )
.
Phillips, W.
,
Speeches
,
Lectures and Letters
.
(Boston, 1894).
Peterson, Florence, Survey of Labor Ec onomics . (New York:
Harper and B rother s
,
v^r7~T",
Powderly, T. V., Thirty Years of Labor . (Columbus, Ohio:
Excelsior Publishing House, 1890 )
.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., Business Cycles . (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company Inc.) Vol. 2.
t » ,
\
Shorter Workday . The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
Cleveland, Ohio, March, 1937.
Siberling, Norman J., The Dynamics of Business . (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1943 )
.
Slichter, Sumner H., Implications of the Shorter Hour Movement .
Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, January,
1934.
Taft, Phillip, Economics and Problems of Labor
.
(New York:
Stackpole and Heck Inc., 1948).
The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences
.
(New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1932) Vol. 7.
The National Recovery Administration
.
American Liberty League,
Washington, D.C., Document No. 11, January, 1935.
Todd, Arthur James, Industry and Society
.
(New York: Henry
Holt and Company^ 1933)
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor
Statistics . 1947 Edition, Bulletin No. 916.
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Information
Bulletin . Vol. 9, June, 1942.
Ware, N.J., The Labor Movement in the United States . 1860-1895,
(New York: D.C. Heath and Company, 19997.
Work Less or Earn More ? (You and Industry Series, Booklet
Number 7, 1936,) National Association of Manufacturers.
Yellen, Samuel, Arne ri c an Labor Struggles
.
(New York: Harcourt
Brace and Company, 1936 )
.
f. jOO
.
’• o .
t*',' . <
.
.
-
•
.
• rt.
• • • «
• t S'!, f
k
c
107 .
ABSTRACT
The first strike over the hours of work occured in
Philadelphia in 1791, when the carpenters struck for a ten-
hour day. During these early years the demand for shorter
hours was led by skilled craftsmen who were organized. The
opposition was favored by public opinion, which not only con-
doned but favored the long working day from "sun to sun."
Idleness was considered a vice. However, with the skilled
crafts in the lead, particularly the building trades, the
hours of work were shortened slowly, but real progress was
not made until after the Civil War.
Immediately after the war, labor organizations sought to
shorten hours through government legislation, for they were
not yet strong enough to wage an economic struggle. During
this period the Eight-Hour Leagues became prominent, and Ira
Steward was one of the leaders of the movement.
The Knights of Labor also favored legislative action
alone to attain the eight-hour day, and the record of the
organization indicates that it offered little more than moral
support to the issue. With the advent of the American Federa
tion of Labor, the method was changed from legislative to
economic action. May 1, 1886 was chosen as the date for a
general strike for the eight-hour day. The Haymarket Square
disaster was the result of the strike in Chicago, and this
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incident destroyed whatever success the eight-hour walkout
might have obtained. Various dates were chosen in the 1890’s
by the American Federation of Labor to strike for the shorter
hours. Although these strikes were moderately successful, the
eight-hour movement, as such, came to a close.
During the first decade of the new century, the agitation
for shorter hours by individual unions became increasingly
stronger. Between 1900 and 1914 the building trades workers
and a few other fortunately situated and well organized groups
obtained the forty-four-hour week in various parts of the
country. In 1916, the Adamson Act established a basic eight-
hour day for employees on interstate railroads. Shortly later.
World War I witnessed a reduction in the standard hours of work
on account of the renewed strength of labor unions.
The American Federation of Labor during the twenties
sought the five day week, and some industries adopted the new
schedule. The depression of the thirties brought about a great
reduction in hours as a spread-the-work movement came into
being. With the advent of World War II actual hours increased,
but the standard was forty hours in most industries as estab-
lished by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. In the post-
war period, actual hours fell a little and the demand for
a basic thirty-five-hour week began to felt.
Among the theories which have been advanced concerning
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the hours of work, there are many of a social nature. Their
importance rests upon the fact that they have been used widely
and their influence in shortening the hours of work have been
great. Theories involving citizenship, culture, education,
leisure, fatigue, and health may be classified under this
general heading.
During the early years of the nineteenth century, the
main arguments of American labor for reducing working hours
revolved about the social theories. However, economic reasons
have become more prominent in labors bid for shorter hours as
technology has advanced and productivity has increased.
The history of the shorter hours movement in the United
States has been replete with general employer opposition to
reduced hours. Their argumentation against decreasing work
schedules has taken different forms, but fundamentally the
root of their opposition has been the fear that shorter hours
would lead to increased costs; and of course, increased costs,
they have reasoned would mean less profits.
From examination of studies made by the U. S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics and the National Industrial Conference Board
it may be concluded that, in general, shorter hours increase
manhour productivity. In these studies every effort was made
to isolate all other factors affecting productivity by holding
them constant. Thus, the validity of the conclusions are as-
sured.
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Since productivity has increased there arises the theoret-
ical and statistical aspects of the distribution of gains of
this increased productivity. Such an analysis indicates that
the distribution of these gains either to workers or to owners
of capital entirely is not desirable as far as employment and
output are concerned. Only when the savings are distributed
to the consumers in the form of lower prices, and if the de-
mand for the product is elastic, will employment and output
increase. Furthermore, it may be concluded that workers and
the owners of capital will in the long run benefit from such
a distribution.
Closely related to any discussion of the hours of work
issue are the problems involved in the computation of an index
of hours. Although these problems are great, it may be said
that indices of hours, computed with adherence to the normal
rules applicable to all indices, are useful means of examin-
ing the changes in the hours of work. Nonetheless, factors
such as changes in job content which cannot be effectually
eliminated over time, detract from the measurement of changes
in the hours of work alone. Moreover, the fact should be
recognized that an index of hours is purely a quantitative
statistical device which manifests no intensity of the work
performed. Finally an index number of hours does not indicate
the pattern of work. For example, the figures may include
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